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Innovation Policy Pluralism 
abstract.  When lawyers and scholars speak of “intellectual property,” they are generally 
referring to a combination of two distinct elements: an innovation incentive that promises a market-
based reward to producers of knowledge goods, and an allocation mechanism that makes access to 
knowledge goods conditional upon payment of a proprietary price. Distinguishing these two ele-
ments clarifies ongoing debates about intellectual property and opens up new possibilities for in-
novation policy. Once intellectual property is disaggregated into its core components, each element 
can be combined synergistically with non-IP innovation incentives such as prizes, tax preferences, 
and direct spending on grants and government research, or with non-IP allocation mechanisms 
that promote broader access to knowledge goods. 
 In this Article, we build a novel conceptual framework for analyzing combinations of IP and 
non-IP policy mechanisms and present a new vocabulary to characterize those combinations. 
Matching involves the pairing of an IP incentive with a non-IP allocation mechanism—or, vice 
versa, the pairing of a non-IP incentive with IP as an allocation strategy. Mixing entails the use of 
IP and non-IP tools on the same side of the incentive/allocation divide: i.e., the use of both IP and 
non-IP innovation incentives, or of IP and non-IP allocation mechanisms. Layering refers to the 
use of different policies at different jurisdictional levels, such as using non-IP innovation incentives 
and allocation mechanisms at the domestic level within an international legal system oriented 
around IP. After setting forth this framework, we identify reasons why different combinations of 
IP and non-IP tools may be optimal in specific circumstances. 
 Our project is not merely theoretical: we argue that “pluralism”—the combination of IP and 
non-IP policies—provides a more descriptively accurate account of the innovation policy landscape 
than those that dominate the existing literature. Governments routinely, though often unwittingly, 
incorporate strategies of matching, mixing, and layering into their innovation policies. Even in the 
pharmaceutical industry—a sector sometimes described as the poster child for the pure IP patent 
system—the United States and other countries rely on complex combinations of IP and non-IP 
elements at the domestic level, all layered within an international IP system that apportions the 
costs of knowledge production across countries. Dissecting and reassembling the elements of this 
knowledge-production system reveals a richer menu of possibilities for IP reform, with potential 
applications to property law more broadly. 
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introduction 
What is intellectual property (IP)? From the innovator’s perspective, it is a 
set of rules that rewards producers of knowledge goods with temporary exclusive 
rights to their creations. From the consumer’s perspective, it is a set of rules that 
makes access to knowledge goods conditional upon the payment of a price above 
the marginal cost of those goods. Both characterizations are accurate. But they 
describe two very different elements of intellectual property. Contrary to the 
conventional characterization of IP as monolithic, these elements need not travel 
together. 
Imagine, for example, a world in which producers of knowledge goods are 
rewarded with patents, but the government then buys those IP rights from pro-
ducers for fair market value and makes access to knowledge goods free. From the 
innovator’s perspective, this system still looks a lot like intellectual property, as 
the innovator receives a market-based reward at the end of the creative process. 
From the consumer’s perspective, however, this world could not look any more 
different from IP—rather than paying a proprietary price for access to knowledge 
goods, the consumer can gain access at no cost. 
Now imagine an alternative world in which knowledge goods are produced 
in government laboratories by public employees, but the government then 
claims a patent on the resulting knowledge goods and behaves like a monopolist 
in the market. From the perspective of the innovator (the government em-
ployee), this world looks nothing like IP: she is paid a fixed salary regardless of 
her output, and her laboratory’s funding does not depend on the success of her 
projects or on market assessments of their value. From the perspective of the 
consumer, however, this world looks almost exactly like IP. The only difference 
is that the entity to which the consumer pays a proprietary price is the govern-
ment rather than a private firm. 
The point can also be made in more general terms. From the perspective of 
the inventor or creator, IP is an innovation incentive—it establishes the payoff 
structure for producers of knowledge goods. From the perspective of consumers, 
including both end users and those who use knowledge goods as an input to 
subsequent creation, IP is an allocation mechanism—it establishes the terms under 
which individuals and firms can gain access to knowledge goods. But these are 
not simply two different perspectives on the same policy. IP’s innovation incen-
tive and its allocation mechanism are distinct. 
Distinguishing between IP as an innovation incentive and IP as an allocation 
mechanism clarifies ongoing debates in innovation law and policy. Consider the 
claim that IP’s monetary payoffs “crowd out” other motivations that might lead 
researchers to pursue the projects with the highest social value, such as basic 
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research efforts that lack immediate commercial applications.
1
 This is a criticism 
of IP as an innovation incentive, not a criticism of it as an allocation mechanism. 
We can imagine a scenario in which government researchers receive a fixed salary 
regardless of which projects they pursue—thus reducing their vulnerability to 
the “crowding out” effect of IP—while the government still claims patents on the 
resulting inventions and behaves like a monopolist in the product market. Alter-
natively, consider the argument that IP leads to allocative inefficiencies because 
monopolists set prices above marginal cost, resulting in deadweight loss that af-
fects both end-users and cumulative innovators.
2
 This is a criticism of IP as an 
allocation mechanism, not a criticism of IP as an innovation incentive. We can 
imagine a scenario in which the government makes knowledge goods available 
to all on an open-access basis—and so avoids the deadweight loss problem—
while purchasing patents from inventors for the expected net present value of 
the future patent profits. Such a system would be vulnerable to the “crowding 
out” objection, but not the allocative inefficiency objection. 
Just as specific criticisms of IP tend to be directed at either the incentive ele-
ment or the allocation element but not both, the virtues of IP tend to be partic-
ular to one element or the other. Consider the claim that IP is superior to gov-
ernment-set rewards such as prizes and grants because it leverages private 
information from market actors to establish payoffs.
3
 This is a defense of IP as 
an innovation incentive, with only partial applicability to IP as an allocation 
mechanism. We can imagine a “patent buyout” scheme in which payoffs for in-
novators are set through an auction that leverages private information from mar-
ket actors, while at the same time patented products are available to consumers 
on an open-access basis. The informational benefit of a market-set reward gives 
us a reason to adopt IP as an innovation incentive, but it does not necessarily 
weigh in favor of IP as an allocation mechanism. Alternatively, consider the claim 
that IP is superior to other innovation policies with respect to luxury goods be-
cause it embodies a normatively attractive user-pays principle.
4
 This is a defense 
 
1. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-97 (2006) (discussing this “crowding out” effect). 
2. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 982 (2012); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards 
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 529 (2001). 
3. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive Sys-
tem?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54-55 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); 
Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 703 (1983). 
4. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303, 349-51 (2013). 
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of IP as an allocation mechanism, but it tells us very little about how innovation 
incentives should be structured. 
The incentive/allocation distinction not only clarifies current IP debates, but 
also opens up new possibilities for innovation policy. The recognition that we 
can use IP as an innovation incentive while allocating knowledge goods on an 
open-access basis prompts the question: where and why might we choose to do 
so? Further, once one realizes that IP innovation incentives can be combined pro-
ductively with non-IP allocation mechanisms (and vice versa), it is a natural next 
step to consider whether and when we might choose to combine IP and non-IP 
mechanisms on the same side of the innovation/allocation divide. Here too, we 
can identify a wide range of circumstances in which IP/non-IP combinations can 
advance the goals of innovation law. 
The combinatorial possibilities become even richer when we consider that 
domestic innovation policies exist in a globalized world, beneath a layer of inter-
national IP law. The international IP framework, we argue, functions as a mech-
anism for allocating the costs of innovation across countries, but it does not dic-
tate the choice of innovation policies within countries. States can adopt their own 
non-IP innovation incentives and their own non-IP allocation mechanisms while 
remaining in compliance with their obligations under international IP treaties. 
And even if international law were to shift away from its current IP orientation, 
states might choose to use IP tools in order to incentivize innovation and allocate 
knowledge goods domestically. Domestic and international knowledge-good re-
gimes are, we argue, largely separable both in theory and in practice. 
While the examples above call on readers to engage in imaginative exercises, 
the claims of this Article are not exclusively theoretical. We argue that “plural-
ism”—as defined by the combination of IP and non-IP policies, or different types 
of non-IP policies—provides a more descriptively accurate account of the inno-
vation policy landscape than those that dominate the existing literature. In other 
words, we can do more than imagine the possibility of combining IP and non-
IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms in the ways described above. 
We can observe a wide range of real-world examples in which such combinations 
are already in use. But these real-world combinations appear to have arisen by 
happenstance rather than design, and proposals for further reform would benefit 
from more careful consideration of IP’s distinct elements. 
Our overarching objective is to set out a framework for the study of plural-
istic innovation policy arrangements that can organize and motivate further re-
search across subfields. In so doing, we introduce a new vocabulary for charac-
terizing and comparing IP/non-IP combinations. First, as previewed above, we 
define and distinguish innovation incentives, which establish the payoff structure 
for producers of knowledge goods, and allocation mechanisms, which establish 
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the conditions under which consumers can use knowledge goods. We then de-
scribe the three ways that IP and non-IP innovation incentives and allocation 
mechanisms can be combined. Matching involves the pairing of an IP innovation 
incentive with a non-IP allocation mechanism or vice versa, the pairing of a non-
IP innovation incentive with IP as an allocation strategy. Mixing involves the 
combination of IP and non-IP innovation incentives, or IP and non-IP allocation 
mechanisms—that is, IP and non-IP tools are used on the same side of the in-
centive/allocation divide. Finally, layering refers to the use of different policies at 
different jurisdictional levels, such as using non-IP innovation incentives and 
allocation mechanisms at the domestic level within an international legal system 
oriented around IP. Theoretically, layering could work the other way, with IP at 
the domestic level and a non-IP mechanism for apportioning the costs of 




Part I provides an overview of the existing literature that compares IP with 
non-IP innovation policies such as prizes, grants, and tax preferences. With no-
table exceptions, that literature has focused on the choice between IP and non-IP 
alternatives rather than on how these policies might be fruitfully combined. Part 
II—the heart of the Article—explores the circumstances under which IP and non-
IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms might be deployed together 
to advance innovation policy’s broader goals. Part III moves from theory to prac-
tice and illustrates innovation policy pluralism in action, with particular atten-
tion to the pharmaceutical sector in the United States and abroad. This sector is 
generally treated as the strongest case for patents—even patent critic Richard 
Posner has called the pharmaceutical industry “the poster child for the patent 
system.”
6
 We show that, in practice, the policy mechanisms used for drug devel-
opment and distribution involve substantial use of nonpatent innovation incen-
tives and allocation mechanisms in conjunction with the patent system, all op-
erating beneath a superstratum of international innovation law that looks quite 
 
5. For an extended discussion of factors that may have led countries to converge around an in-
ternational IP regime instead of coordinating on alternative knowledge-production mecha-
nisms such as grants or prizes, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge 
Goods and Nation-States, 101 MINN. L. REV. 167, 226-34 (2016). Layering also refers to the use 
of different innovation policies at other jurisdictional levels, such as the layering of federal 
policy over state and local incentive and allocation choices. See infra note 146 and accompany-
ing text. 
6. Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents 
-in-america/259725 [https://perma.cc/2C2R-KBMU]; see also MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. 
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 213 (2008) (“The pharmaceutical industry is the 
poster child of every intellectual monopoly supporter.”). 
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different from its sublayers. Finally, Part IV illustrates the value of our mixing, 
matching, and layering framework outside the patent context, in other areas of 
intellectual property and across property law more generally. 
i .  incentivizing innovation: patents vs.  prizes vs.  grants 
vs.  tax preferences 
Although intellectual property law historically has been the principal field in 
which legal scholars have thought about innovation policy,
7
 governments in fact 
encourage innovation and allocate access to knowledge goods through a wide 
variety of mechanisms in addition to IP.
8
 In the United States, direct funding 
from the federal government through grants and national laboratories accounts 
for nearly one-quarter of the five hundred billion dollars spent on research and 
development (R&D) each year.
9
 R&D tax incentives—specifically, the credit for 
increasing research activities under § 41 and the expensing of research and ex-
 
7. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2003) 
(“Patent law is our primary policy tool to promote innovation.”). By “intellectual property 
law,” we mean all the legal frameworks through which knowledge-good producers can gen-
erate exclusivity, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, regulatory exclusiv-
ity, and state law IP protections. See generally 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017, at 31-39 (2017) (providing a broad overview of 
various types of IP law). 
8. By “knowledge good” we mean “anything that can be digitized,” but our argument does not 
depend on the exact contours of this category. HAL VARIAN, MARKETS FOR INFORMATION 
GOODS 3 (1998). The important point is that many intangible goods will not be efficiently 
produced absent state intervention because they have characteristics of public goods: they 
benefit persons other than the producer (nonrivalry), and these persons are difficult to ex-
clude from these benefits (nonexcludability). 
9. See Nat’l Sci. Bd., 2018 Science & Engineering Indicators, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. 4-20 tbl.4-3 (2018), 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4ZM4-L45E] (reporting that the federal government funded $121 billion out of $495 billion 
total R&D expenditures in 2015). 
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perimental expenditures under § 174
10
—cost the federal government an addi-
tional twenty billion dollars.
11
 When targeted R&D tax incentives such as those 
for orphan drugs are added to this tally, that number is even higher.
12
 Govern-
ment prizes are also a small but growing part of the U.S. policy toolkit for incen-
tivizing innovation,
13
 with the number of prize competitions conducted by fed-
eral agencies more than doubling between 2012 and 2016.
14
 
In prior work, we developed a framework for comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of these different tools, although we did not delve into whether or 
how different policies could be fruitfully combined. We also did not discuss—
because we had not yet come to understand—the incentive/allocation distinction 
that is our focus in this Article. Our main argument was that every government 
transfer to spur investment in knowledge-good production embodies the an-
swers to two distinct questions: 
 
1.   Who decides the size of the transfer?
15
 In some cases, governments tailor 
rewards on a project-by-project basis, such as by setting a fixed prize for 
a particular technological improvement, awarding a grant to a researcher 
 
10. I.R.C. §§ 41, 174 (2018). In its simplest form, § 41 provides a nonrefundable tax credit of 
twenty percent times qualified research expenses over a base amount, with the base amount 
calculated as a function of past spending. The details of the credit are extraordinarily compli-
cated and lie beyond the scope of this Article. Section 174 allows firms to write off certain R&D 
costs immediately rather than amortizing them over several years. For an overview, see Hemel 
& Ouellette, supra note 4, at 322-26. Section 174 is now set to expire at the end of 2021, see Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13206 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 174(e)), but informed 
observers expect a concerted lobbying effort to extend that provision beyond the current sun-
set date, see How Tax Reform Affects Companies Conducting R&D, MOSSADAMS (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.mossadams.com/articles/2018/january/tax-reform-affects-rd-credits [https://
perma.cc/FP7D-R3ZS]. 
11. See Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 21 tbl.1 (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures 
-FY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8U8-6XFF] (reporting the cost of these incentives as $19.8 
billion in 2017). 
12. See id. at 24 tbl.1. The federal tax law passed in December 2017 cuts the value of the orphan 
drug credit in half. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13401(a) (to be codified 
at I.R.C. § 45C(a)). 
13. See Newest Challenges, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov [https://perma.cc
/VML9-UFJV] (listing open prize competitions); see also Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 
317-19 (discussing the recent growth in government prizes). 
14. See Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Implementation of Federal Prize Authority: Fiscal Year 2016 Pro-
gress Report, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT U.S. 13 tbl.3 (July 7, 2017), https://www.challenge
.gov/toolkit/files/2017/07/FY2016-Implementation-Federal-Prize-Authority-Report-and 
-Appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUL8-TPWG]. 
15. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 327-33. 
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for a particular project, or budgeting a certain amount for specified re-
search at government labs. In contrast, for patents and general R&D tax 
preferences, the government sets relatively technology-neutral ground 
rules, and the reward size is largely determined by market forces.
16
 To 
be sure, “market-set” rewards such as patents and general R&D tax pref-
erences still involve some degree of state involvement, but government 
officials do less to pick winners (or potential winners) in those cases 
than in the context of prizes, grants, and research at government labs. 
2.  When is the reward transferred?
17
 Some mechanisms, such as grants, 
research at national labs, and tax credits, are provided ex ante for all pro-
jects, before the results are known. Others, such as prizes and patents, 











16. To be clear, there are many government decisions embedded in “market-set” transfers; for 
example, they may vary in size, such as based on the size of the tax credit or the length and 
scope of the patent rights. Moreover, tax credits are currently based on the input of R&D costs 
rather than the output of excludable social value, and it is not obvious which would be most 
closely aligned with optimal transfer size. See id. at 329-32. But the specific details of either 
class of incentives might be adjusted. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Adjusting Patent Dam-
ages for Nonpatent Incentives, 26 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 187-88 (2018) (noting that patent 
damages could be calculated based on risk-adjusted R&D costs, accounting for costs of non-
patent incentives). For our purposes, the important point is that for any of these innovation 
policy mechanisms, the government is not making technology-specific judgments about 
which projects should be pursued. 
17. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 333-45. 
18. For the purposes of this framework, we treat patents as akin to other mechanisms for provid-
ing exclusivity, including other forms of IP (such as trade secrets and trademarks) and FDA-
administered regulatory exclusivity. The differences among these exclusivity mechanisms, 
while important, are not our focus here. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text. 
19. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 333 fig.1. We also noted a third dimension, which 
foreshadowed our incentive/allocation distinction here: who pays for the knowledge produc-
tion—all taxpayers, or only users of the resulting products and services? See id. at 345-52. To 
allocate access to knowledge goods, the patent system relies on proprietary pricing, with users 
paying a price for the good set by a patent holder who exerts market power. Many knowledge 
goods in the United States, however, are distributed or subsidized by the government. Prom-
inent examples include the Medicare Part D program and Medicaid, through which patented 
drugs are distributed to patients at deep discounts. See infra notes 165-171, 182-186 and ac-
companying text. 
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FIGURE 1. 
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 Although we have drawn discrete boxes for simplicity, each dimension is a 
continuous spectrum rather than a binary choice.
20
 Imagine, for example, that 
policy makers want to encourage development of a Zika virus vaccine, and as-
sume for now that the reward will be paid ex post. If policy makers favor a gov-
ernment-set reward, they could offer a fixed one-billion-dollar prize for the first 
innovator to develop an effective vaccine; if they favor a market-set reward, they 
could offer monopoly rights for the first vaccine producer (resulting in a reward 
entirely based on consumers’ willingness to pay). Yet there are also a number of 
intermediate solutions. For example, the government might offer a prize of fifty 
dollars per person inoculated, which would reflect a government assessment of 
inoculation’s social value as well as information based on consumer choices re-
garding the new vaccine’s appeal.
21
 Similarly, we can imagine an array of inter-
mediate solutions on the vertical reward-timing axis because transfers can be 
 
20. While the who-decides and reward-timing questions are critical dimensions in the design of 
innovation incentives, they are not—of course—the only choices that matter. For a thorough 
discussion of policy choices within the “grants” box, see W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174769. 
21. A similar market-based prize, with a subsidy per dose sold, is being used to incentivize global 
distribution of pneumococcal vaccines. See How the Pneumococcal AMC Works, GAVI: THE VAC-
CINE ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/funding/pneumococcal-amc/how-the-pneumococcal
-amc-works [https://perma.cc/TK8E-JBDA]. The proposed Health Impact Fund would sim-
ilarly entail a more comprehensive market-based medical-prize scheme. See AIDAN HOLLIS & 
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scheduled at any time during the R&D process, based on varying demonstra-
tions of success. 
The existence of intermediate solutions does not, in our view, detract from 
the usefulness of the government-set/market-set and ex ante/ex post distinc-
tions. Some of the most oft-used dichotomies in legal analysis, such as rules ver-
sus standards
22
 and property rules versus liability rules,
23
 also admit of interme-
diate cases and blurred lines.
24
 Framing a problem in polar terms allows us to 
focus on the reasons why policy makers might prefer to tilt more in one direction 
than the other—i.e., why policy makers might prefer more or less government 
involvement in setting reward size, and why policy makers might prefer earlier 
or later delivery of those rewards. That approach can, we submit, serve to clarify 
consequential policy choices even when (and indeed because) it simplifies com-
plex phenomena. 
The chief arguments relevant to the horizontal axis (government-set vs. 
market-set) will be familiar to many readers. Government-set rewards entail an 
informational burden that bureaucrats may be ill equipped to handle, even with 
mechanisms like peer review and expert panels for consolidating information. 
Markets, by contrast, aggregate widely dispersed information regarding con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for new knowledge goods. Weighing in favor of gov-
ernment-set rewards, however, is the argument that willingness to pay may be 
an imperfect proxy for social value. Market institutions may assign a reward that 
is too low (relative to social value) for knowledge goods that generate positive 
externalities when consumed, such as low-emission vehicles or smoking-cessa-
 
THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 
13-26 (2008). As we discuss later, even though such schemes involve more market information 
than a fixed prize, they provide less information about how much consumers value a new 
innovation over substitutes than above-marginal-cost pricing. See infra note 138 and accom-
panying text. 
22. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577-78 n.47 
(1992) (noting importance of “intermediate cases”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 n.19, 391 n.27, 394-97, 403-04, 406-08, 423 & n.94, 427-28 (1985) 
(characterizing different legal directives as more or less “rule-like” or “standard-like”). 
23. See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 
YALE L.J. 2149, 2153-57 (1997) (noting intermediate and more extreme positions on the prop-
erty-liability spectrum). 
24. For example, the rule “no vehicles in the park” defers to later decision makers what constitutes 
a “vehicle,” and that latter inquiry may be more standard-like than rule-like. Similarly, a no-
trespass rule enforced exclusively through the payment of fines seems to straddle the property 
rule/liability rule divide. 
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tion technologies. Conversely, market institutions may prove superior to gov-
ernment-set rewards when political pathologies skew policy outcomes toward 
the interests of the powerful few.
25
 
With respect to the vertical axis, ex ante rewards carry three significant ad-
vantages over ex post rewards. First, ex ante payouts minimize the need for po-
tential innovators to raise capital from private investors. When rewards are paid 
out ex post, potential innovators (or, at least, those without large cash reserves) 
must raise capital to cover costs during the interim period between when a pro-
ject is undertaken and when its result becomes known. This bridge financing 
entails significant transaction costs even in relatively well-functioning capital 
markets, as in the market for venture-capital investment in Silicon Valley.
26
 Sec-
ond, ex ante payouts reduce the risk borne by potential innovators who pursue 
uncertain projects: the ex ante payment covers at least a portion of the innova-
tor’s costs and thus leaves the innovator with less to lose in the event that the 
project fails. This risk-reduction aspect is particularly advantageous if potential 
innovators tend to be risk-averse.
27
 Third, ex ante rewards confer more “bang” 
for the government’s innovation-incentivizing “buck” when potential innova-
tors are particularly present-minded (or, more specifically, when potential inno-
vators have higher discount rates than society at large).
28
 Under those circum-
stances, the benefit to potential innovators of accelerating payment exceeds the 
cost to the government of money’s time value. 
The case for ex ante rewards, however, is not airtight. For one thing, ex ante 
rewards arguably entail greater informational burdens than ex post rewards, at 
least on the government-set side of the divide. That is, it may be easier for the 
government to set a goal and a reward size (e.g., X dollars for the first team to 
develop a Zika virus vaccine) than for the government to pick the projects most 
 
25. To be sure, markets can and often do disfavor the less powerful when the value of a good to 
an individual user exceeds his or her ability to pay. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
26. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 334-39. 
27. See id. at 340-42. Andres Sawicki has questioned this assumption. See Andres Sawicki, Risky 
IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81 (2016). But his observations of creators who succeeded despite 
enormous risk do not indicate that these creators would not have preferred less risk. See id. at 
116-17. And even if some creators are risk-seeking, much investment in knowledge production 
comes from firms that show behavior consistent with risk aversion. See Daniel A. Rogers, Does 
Executive Portfolio Structure Affect Risk Management? CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Corporate 
Derivatives Usage, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 271 (2002). Note, however, that a firm’s risk profile is 
likely to be affected by its executive compensation contracts, and that any general statement 
about firm risk attitudes is unlikely to hold in all circumstances. See id. at 274 (“Depending on 
the extent of convexity in the contract, the manager could be induced into less risk averse, 
risk-neutral, or even risk-seeking behavior.”). 
28. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 342-44. 
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likely to reach that goal and the appropriate grants for each such project (e.g., Y 
dollars for the Zika virus vaccine project at the Centers for Disease Control, Z 
dollars for the Zika project at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Q dollars 
for the Zika project at Harvard Medical School, and so on). Furthermore, ex post 
rewards may better incentivize potential innovators to pursue projects with 
gusto (e.g., a researcher may be less likely to slack off if she is competing with 
other researchers for a future prize than if she already has a government grant 
that covers her costs). 
In sum, no single innovation-incentive mechanism is uniformly superior in 
all circumstances. Direct spending through grants, procurement contracts, and 
in-house research at federal agencies will be most effective where market signals 
are poor proxies for social benefits, capital constraints are significant, and the 
government has a comparative advantage in assessing the costs and benefits of 
potential projects. (Space exploration arguably satisfies all of these criteria.
29
) 
Fixed prizes are most effective for projects such as algorithmic challenges, for 
which the government can set a clear goal but is at a disadvantage for identifying 
the most promising projects, and where capital constraints are less significant. 
Patents, like prizes, are most effective when innovators have ready access to the 
necessary financial capital and when the negative effects of risk aversion are lim-
ited. Patents are preferable to prizes when market signals provide superior infor-
mation about social benefits than the government can easily acquire (such as for 
pharmaceuticals affecting wealthy populations), and prizes are preferable to pa-
tents when willingness to pay is a poor proxy for social value (such as for vaccines 
aimed at contagious diseases primarily afflicting the very poor). Finally, refund-
able tax credits, like patents, are most effective when the government is at a dis-
advantage evaluating projects, but they may be more effective than patents when 
researchers face a high risk of failure and run up against binding capital con-
straints. A transformative leap in battery technology might be one such example. 
Of course, all of these conclusions are contingent on the specific implementation 
of the incentive policies as well as on factual details about the technical field. The 
goal of our prior work was to illuminate the key differences between these inno-
vation policy tools and to highlight the most important factors that might lead 
policy makers to choose one over the others. 
 
29. The rise of SpaceX, entrepreneur Elon Musk’s space technology venture, is not necessarily a 
counterexample. SpaceX relies heavily on contracts with NASA, which “has long been 
SpaceX’s most important customer” and will provide most of the funding for the Dragon 2 
craft that will make SpaceX’s much-anticipated moon trip. See Samantha Masunaga, Don’t 
Expect a Space Race Between SpaceX and NASA. They Need Each Other, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017, 
7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-spacex-nasa-20170301-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/MFU6-Q3D9]. 
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So far, we have focused on when different incentives might individually be 
most effective. The rich theoretical literature on IP versus non-IP alternatives has 
relatively little to say about when these different innovation policies might oper-
ate effectively in combination. As we discuss in Part III, innovation policy plu-
ralism is not merely theoretical—the real world involves significant mixing and 
matching of different policy tools. In the United States, recipients of federal 
grants, prizes, and R&D tax credits need not relinquish their patent rights,
30
 and 
there are a number of specific policies such as the Orphan Drug Act that offer an 
array of incentives for a targeted goal.
31
 But while some empirical and descriptive 
studies of innovation systems in practice have necessarily discussed complemen-
tary policies,
32
 and some contributions to the extensive patents-versus-prizes lit-
erature have concluded that the optimal solution involves both,
33
 scholars of in-
novation law and policy lack a general framework for characterizing and 
comparing IP/non-IP combinations. Part II of this Article seeks to fill that gap. 
i i .  optimizing outcomes:  matching, mixing, and layering 
innovation policies 
In this Part, we present an original taxonomy designed to categorize the var-
ious ways that governments can combine innovation policies rather than rely on 
a “pure IP” or “pure non-IP” approach. We focus on IP versus non-IP because 
of IP’s dominance in the legal literature on innovation, but this taxonomy also 
 
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 3719(j)(1) (2018); 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2018). 
31. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 
42 & 46 U.S.C.). The Act provides (1) increased grants for orphan drug development, 21 
U.S.C. § 360ee (2018); (2) seven years of patent-like market exclusivity, id. § 360cc; and (3) a 
tax credit for fifty percent of a pharmaceutical firm’s clinical testing expenses for orphan 
drugs, I.R.C. §§ 45C, 280C, 6096 (2018). 
32. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay et al., Public R&D Investments and Private-Sector Patenting: Evidence 
from NIH Funding Rules, REV. ECON. STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://doi.org
/10.1093/restud/rdy034 [https://perma.cc/JZ62-7ECX] (finding that “a $10 million boost in 
NIH funding leads to a net increase of 2.3 patents”); Liam Brunt et al., Inducement Prizes and 
Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 657 (2012) (finding that patents and complementary U.K. 
prizes offered between 1839 and 1939 both boosted innovation); Henry G. Grabowski et al., 
The Roles of Patents and Research and Development Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 
HEALTH AFF. 302 (2015) (summarizing the array of incentives available for pharmaceuticals); 
Yuri Simachev et al., Public Support for Innovation in Russian Firms: Looking for Improvements 
in Corporate Performance Quality, 21 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RES. 13 (2015) (comparing tax in-
centives and public subsidies for Russian firms). 
33. See, e.g., V.V. Chari et al., Patents and Prizes: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Inno-
vations, 147 J. ECON. THEORY 781 (2012). 
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applies to combinations of different non-IP policies. We first distinguish be-
tween innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms. The IP system, for exam-
ple, consists of an ex post, market-based innovation incentive combined with an 
allocation mechanism relying on proprietary pricing. We then consider innova-
tion policy matches and mixes. By matching, we mean the use of IP law on one 
side of the incentive/allocation divide and a non-IP policy on the other side.
34
 By 
mixing, we mean the combination of IP and non-IP policies on the same side of 
the incentive/allocation divide. Finally, we discuss the possibility of using differ-
ent innovation policies at different jurisdictional levels, such as using non-IP in-
centives and allocation mechanisms at the domestic level while using the inter-
national IP regime as a framework for global cost-sharing—a strategy we refer 
to as layering. We also seek to show how our typology of matching, mixing, and 
layering has the potential to organize and motivate further research on pluralistic 
innovation policy arrangements. 
A. Incentivizing Innovation vs. Allocating Access 
The starting point for our analysis is the distinction between innovation in-
centives and allocation mechanisms. By innovation incentive, we mean the payoff 
structure for developing a new knowledge good. By allocation mechanism, we re-
fer to the conditions under which consumers and firms can gain access to 
knowledge goods themselves. Both aspects of IP have been recognized by prior 
scholars,
35
 but we think that disentangling innovation incentives from allocation 
mechanisms clarifies the terms of current debates and opens up new possibilities 
for policy experimentation. 
 
34. Some readers may object that “matching” is used in common parlance to refer to the pairing 
of two of the same (e.g., matching one checkered glove with another). Even in that context, 
though, “matching” implies complementarity rather than identity (i.e., matching the left 
checkered glove with the right). See Ruth La Ferla, ‘Nothing Says Chic Like Matching Your 
Drink to Your Dress,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07 
/fashion/lela-rose-trunk-show-new-york-fashion-week.html [https://perma.cc/FZQ4 
-HK5Z] (“‘I thought of matching the canapés to the drinks,’ [fashion designer Lela Rose] 
said, rolling her eyes, but not really abashed.”). We use the term “matching” to refer to com-
plementary combinations of elements that cross the innovation-incentive/allocation-mecha-
nism divide, though we acknowledge that other authors might have chosen different termi-
nology. 
35. For a few examples of articles describing IP’s allocative function, see Chari et al., supra note 
33; Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19-20 
(1969); Kapczynski, supra note 2; and Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent 
Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 340 (2017). 
the yale law journal 128:544  2019 
560 
In a pure IP system, the innovation incentive—the payoff structure for de-
veloping a new knowledge good—is relatively straightforward. The potential in-
novator—an individual, firm, or joint venture—bears the cost of research and 
development, and if the R&D effort fails, the innovator receives no reward. If the 
effort succeeds in yielding a new knowledge good that meets the criteria for pa-
tentability, the innovator obtains a time-limited exclusive right over the use of 
the knowledge good. The payoff to the innovator in the event of success is equal 
to the value of supracompetitive rents she can earn during the patent’s life. For 
simplicity, we will refer to these as monopoly rents, although in practice many 
patents and other forms of IP do not offer monopoly power.
36
 
In a pure prize system, the potential innovator bears the cost of R&D, and 
receives no reward in the event of failure.
37
 If the effort succeeds in yielding a 
new knowledge good that meets the criteria set by the prize-awarding entity, the 
innovator receives a set payment.
38
 The key distinction between patents and 
fixed prizes on the innovation-incentive side is that market forces determine the 
size of the patent reward, whereas a nonmarket institution determines the size 
of the prize. To be sure, patent rents are typically earned over the course of a 
twenty-year patent life while prizes are typically paid as lump sums, but these 
are not inherent characteristics of patents or prizes. Patentees can choose to sell 
their monopoly rights for a lump sum at any point (including to government 
purchasers),
39




36. Models often treat patents as granting monopolies over particular markets, but the link be-
tween patents and markets is more attenuated. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, 
Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 325-27 (2017); Stephen 
Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 1960-72 
(2016). Of course, patents are effective at facilitating transfers from consumers to producers 
only to the extent that they offer some form of market power. 
37. In practice, innovation inducement prizes often mix features of what we refer to as a “pure 
prize system” with other policy tools. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Inno-
vation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016); Benjamin N. Roin, 
Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014). 
38. A 1999 National Academy of Engineering report urged the federal government to make 
greater use of technology inducement prizes, see NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDER-
ALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE app. A at A-1 (1999), and 
the government has done so on a limited scale, see About, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://challenge
.gov/a/buzz/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/27E5-EBPV]. 
39. Indeed, many patentees do sell to various patent-aggregating intermediaries. See Mark A. 
Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126-
29 (2013) (describing these business models). 
40. As noted above, governments can also blend features of patents and prizes in a single policy 
tool, such as prize systems in which the reward is tied to a market signal such as sales volume. 
innovation policy pluralism 
561 
Pure grant systems (including research at government labs) and pure R&D 
tax credits differ from patent and prize systems on the incentive side in that po-
tential innovators do not bear the full cost of R&D activities and their payoffs do 
not depend on the results of a particular project.
41
 This is not to say that potential 
innovators have no incentive to succeed under these ex ante systems. An inno-
vator’s past performance, for example, may affect future grants.
42
 Likewise, an 
innovator’s ability to offset tax liabilities using the federal tax credit may depend 
on overall profitability (and thus, the overall success of the innovator’s various 
projects). Moreover, these ex ante mechanisms vary in the degree to which the 
government determines the share of R&D costs offset. Grant systems and gov-
ernment research require much more picking and choosing of projects by gov-
ernment officials (aided by government-designed peer-review mechanisms), 
while government assessments of the social value of a particular project do not 
determine the size of the federal tax credit. Our goal here is not to delve into the 
details of these mechanisms but to emphasize that each entails a tunable inno-
vation-incentive component. That is, each offers potential innovators a payoff 
structure that determines the extent to which she will bear R&D costs and the 
rewards she will receive contingent upon different project outcomes. 
Importantly, the innovation-incentive component is not the only relevant 
feature of an innovation policy. We use the term “allocation mechanism” to refer 
to the terms under which consumers and firms can gain access to knowledge 
goods. A pure patent system relies on temporary monopoly pricing for access 
allocation.
43
 During the life of the patent, the patent holder sets the price that 
consumers and firms must pay to use the knowledge good, and those who use 
the knowledge good without paying that price are liable for infringement. Vari-
ations on the theme are possible to imagine. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, for 
example, have proposed a modified patent regime that would confer exclusive 
 
See Roin, supra note 37, at 1058 (noting that “[m]ost proposals for prize systems rely on ob-
serving sales volume to calculate prizes”). 
41. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 320-26 (discussing the use of direct spending on grants 
and government labs and the use of R&D tax incentives in the United States); see also supra 
note 10 (discussing I.R.C. § 41). Whether potential innovators “bear the full cost of R&D 
activities” when they expense research costs under § 174 is a more complicated question. The 
answer depends on whether the relevant tax system is income-based or consumption-based. 
In an income-based system, expensing R&D costs is economically equivalent to amortizing 
R&D costs along with the government paying a portion of the firm’s R&D budget. In a con-
sumption-based system, expensing is the norm (for R&D and non-R&D costs alike). 
42. See Price, supra note 20, at 35-38. 
43. Again, we refer to “monopoly pricing” for simplicity, even though patents often confer a more 
limited ability to set supracompetitive prices. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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rights for each invention upon two sellers rather one.
44
 The Ayres-Klemperer 
proposal would replace the standard allocation mechanism of monopoly pricing 
with an alternative of duopoly pricing.
45
 At the other end of the spectrum is open 
access: a knowledge good could be placed into the public domain immediately, 
so that all consumers and firms could use it for free. And any of these regimes 
could be combined with a system of subsidies—for example, monopoly pricing 
with a subsidy for purchase. U.S. taxpayers can claim a federal tax credit for 
thirty percent of the expenses of a solar array,
46
 but solar-cell patentees can still 
charge supracompetitive prices to the full extent their market power allows. 
This menu of allocation options is far from exhaustive. For present purposes, 
we stress that the choices of innovation incentive and allocation mechanism are 
distinct. We can imagine a regime in which the government offers to buy patent 
rights from successful innovators at a price equal to the net present value of fu-
ture monopoly rents and then places the patented inventions in the public do-
main. If the assessment of future rents is accurate, then the payoff structure looks 
identical to a patent system from the innovator’s perspective, but the allocation 
mechanism is one of open access rather than monopoly pricing. Or we can im-
agine a regime in which innovation occurs inside government agencies, but the 
government then auctions off monopoly rights with respect to the resulting 
knowledge goods. From the perspective of the researchers working on the R&D 
project, the incentive structure looks identical to research within government 
labs, but the allocation mechanism is one of monopoly pricing. We discuss ad-
ditional possible matches of innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms at 
greater length below. 
 
44. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation In-
centives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 
1031 (1999). As the authors explain, a patent could “give the holder two entitlements: the 
right to be one of only two producers of the product, and the right to receive the proceeds 
from the auction selecting the second producer of the product.” Id. (footnote omitted). As-
suming that collusion between the patentee and the auction winner could be policed effec-
tively, the result is that the patentee would become one of two duopolists in the product mar-
ket, commanding a price above the perfectly competitive price but below the monopoly price. 
Id. at 1032. 
45. Id. The proposal could be modified to provide for triopoly pricing, quadropoly pricing, and 
so on. A cruder version of this proposal would involve capping the price someplace above 
marginal cost, which could be done in exchange for some government buyout, although the 
upper bounds of prices would then no longer be set by the market. 
46. I.R.C. § 25D(a)(1) (2018). The thirty-percent rate is applicable to “qualified solar electric 
property expenditures” placed in service after December 31, 2016, and before January 1, 2020. 
Id. § 25D(g)(1). 
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B. Matching Incentives with Allocation Mechanisms 
As emphasized above, the term “intellectual property” denotes a specific 
match between an innovation incentive (an ex post reward based on a market-
generated estimate of social value) and an allocation mechanism (monopoly 
pricing). Importantly, policy makers can and sometimes do partially decouple 
these elements from one another. They can match an innovation incentive that 
relies on an ex post, market-generated estimate of social value with an allocation 
mechanism of open access. Alternatively, policy makers can match a non-IP in-
novation incentive with an allocation mechanism of monopoly pricing. This Sec-
tion explores both possibilities and explains why matching strategies might be 
desirable under certain circumstances. As we explain, the decoupling is only par-
tial—IP incentives require some probability of IP allocation to generate a market 
estimate of value,
47
 and the choice of allocation mechanism may feed back into 
the innovation incentive to the extent that innovators care about how their 
knowledge goods are allocated.
48
 The important point is that incentives and al-
location are far more separable than generally realized. 
1. Matching IP Innovation Incentives with Non-IP Allocation Mechanisms 
We start with the possibility of matching an IP-like innovation incentive 
with a non-IP allocation mechanism. Matching of this sort might be optimal 
when policy makers want to encourage innovation with an ex post, market-set 
reward, but without the allocative inefficiency and cost to cumulative innovation 
that comes with monopoly pricing. In the terms of Figure 1, the idea is to create 
an innovation incentive in the lower right-hand box, but without the deadweight 
loss of IP monopoly pricing. 
One way to achieve this goal is for the government to purchase patent rights 
from a patent holder and then to place the patent in the public domain. A ra-
tional, self-interested patent holder will sell rights to the government only if of-
fered a price that equals or exceeds the net present value of future patent rents. 
The market (or, more accurately, the patent holder’s expectation of her own mar-
ket reward) thus sets the lower bound on the payoff to the innovator. Once the 
 
47. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
48. For example, even in a system of purely non-IP innovation incentives, IP allocation mecha-
nisms might decrease incentives for researchers who are opposed to anyone propertizing and 
profiting from their inventions, or they might increase incentives for researchers who think 
that IP-based allocation will promote commercialization and widespread adoption of their 
ideas. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text. 
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patent is in the public domain, access is free, and so the deadweight loss of mo-
nopoly pricing is eliminated. Of course, the government must raise the addi-
tional tax revenues to purchase the patent, but revenue raising through broad-
based taxation will generally be more efficient than taxing a single market 
through monopoly pricing.
49
 Indeed, Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele 
argue that such a system of optional government patent buyouts is always more 
efficient than a pure patent system.
50
 
On various occasions, governments have purchased patent rights from inno-
vators and then placed those knowledge goods in the public domain. South Car-
olina purchased the in-state rights to the cotton gin from inventor Eli Whitney 
in 1802.
51
 Thirty-seven years later, the French government bought the patent for 
the Daguerreotype photographic process from the inventor, Louis Jacques 
Mande Daguerre, and then allowed free use of the Daguerreotype process eve-
rywhere except England.
52
 The Daguerreotype example incorporates both 
matching and layering, combining an IP innovation incentive and a non-IP allo-
cation mechanism at the domestic level with the use of international IP law to 
collect patent rents from foreign consumers. 
More recently, the United Kingdom implemented a system known as the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). The taxpayer-funded Na-
tional Health Service purchases medicines from patent holders and then distrib-
utes drugs domestically at zero cost or a discounted price.
53
 PPRS links rewards 
to market prices in two ways. First, the prices offered to pharmaceutical firms 
under PPRS are intended to be “value-based.”
54
 Second, and perhaps more im-
portant, a pharmaceutical firm unsatisfied with the PPRS price can choose to sell 
its products on the unsubsidized market to patients willing to pay out of pocket 
or with private insurance.
55
 The firm’s estimate of the total market value of its 
 
49. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 54. 
50. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 2, at 539. 
51. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
1137, 1145 (1998). 
52. See id. at 1144. 
53. See Fin. & NHS/Meds., Pharmacy & Indus. Grp./17080, The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation 
Scheme 2014, DEP’T HEALTH & ABPI (Dec. 2013), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/675465/The_pharmaceutical
_price_regulation_scheme_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T49M-G3LS]. 
54. Id. at 23. 
55. Id. at 9 (describing the PPRS as a “non-contractual voluntary scheme”); see also Sarah Boseley, 
UK NHS Cancer Patients Denied Drugs Due to Inflated Prices—Experts, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 
2015, 10:47 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/23/uk-cancer 
-patients-being-denied-drugs-due-to-inflated-prices-say-experts [https://perma.cc/92LE 
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patent in the absence of government subsidies thus sets a lower bound on the 
price that it will accept. If the government’s offer is below the patent holder’s 
estimate of the market value, the patent holder will go to market rather than 
transacting with the government. Conversely, if the patent holder does transact 
with the government, then the relevant knowledge good is distributed to pa-
tients at marginal cost.
56
 
A more intricate strategy for matching an IP-based innovation incentive with 
an open-access allocation mechanism involves an auction scheme like that pro-
posed by economist Michael Kremer. Under Kremer’s proposal, patent holders 
could trigger a sealed-bid second-price auction in which investors would bid for 
patent rights.
57
 With some probability p (based on randomized selection), the 
auction winner would purchase the patent from the holder at the second price. 
The auction winner would then hold the patent and be able to earn monopoly 
profits from sales of the relevant good.
58
 With probability 1 – p, the patent rights 
would not go to the auction winner, and instead the government would buy the 
rights from the patent holder at the auction-determined second price and then 
place the patent in the public domain for all to use.
59
 In all cases, the inventor’s 
reward would be set by the expected market returns. Only in portion p of cases, 
though, would access to the knowledge good be allocated to consumers based on 
monopoly pricing. In all other cases, access would be free. 
The ingenuity of the patent buyout proposal is that if p is sufficiently greater 
than zero, profit-motivated private parties will have an incentive to participate in 
the auction and reveal their true valuations of the patent.
60
 At the same time, p 
can be significantly less than 1, such that in many cases (and maybe even a ma-
jority of cases), the relevant knowledge good will be placed in the public do-
main.
61
 A patent buyout scheme, if successful, thus combines some of the most 
attractive elements of IP as an innovation incentive and open access as an alloca-
tion mechanism. Like an IP-based system, a patent buyout scheme relies on mar-
ket actors rather than government officials to estimate the value of a new 
knowledge good, and it harnesses the motivational power of an ex post reward. 
 
-TBE2] (describing bargaining breakdowns when pharmaceutical companies would not 
lower prices to the point that the National Health Service deemed cost-effective). 
56. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 221-22 (analyzing this scheme). 
57. See Kremer, supra note 51, at 1146. 
58. Id. at 1146-47 & fig.I. 
59. Id. at 1147 fig.I. 
60. This mechanism is vulnerable to collusion, although Kremer discusses a number of mecha-
nisms to minimize this risk. Id. at 1157-62. 
61. Id. at 1146-52. 
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Like a non-IP mechanism, patent buyouts lead to free access in most cases and 
thus avoid the added deadweight loss of proprietary pricing.
62
 
There are many possible variations on the patent buyout idea. Kremer pro-
poses a voluntary system in which patent holders first would decide whether to 
trigger an auction at all, and then would decide whether or not to sell the patent 
at the auction-determined price.
63
 By contrast, one can imagine a mandatory 
system in which all patents are put up for auction once they are granted or some 
number of months or years thereafter, or a system in which patent holders who 
trigger the auction are bound to sell at the end of the process. For present pur-
poses, the details of the patent buyout scheme matter less than the conceptual 
point that the proposal illustrates: IP-like innovation incentives that provide in-
novators with an ex post, market-determined reward (similar to the incentives 
currently provided by patents) can be coupled with allocation mechanisms that 
generally allow for open access to knowledge goods.
64
 
2. Matching Non-IP Innovation Incentives with IP-Based Allocation 
Mechanisms 
We have considered matches between IP-like innovation incentives and non-
IP access allocation mechanisms—matches designed to leverage the informa-
tional value of monopoly power while achieving the allocative efficiency of open 
access. One can also imagine matches in the opposite direction: arrangements 
that rely on monopoly power to allocate access to knowledge goods even while 
non-IP tools are used to incentivize innovation. We have already discussed why 
 
62. If the government finances patent buyouts with revenue from a broad-based tax, there will 
still be administrative and compliance costs associated with revenue-raising (though not nec-
essarily any labor market distortion). See Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution 
and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2004, at 159, 164-68. 
63. See Kremer, supra note 51, at 1147 fig.I. 
64. We underscore the adverb “generally.” The matching of IP-like innovation incentives with 
pure open-access allocation mechanisms still requires some IP on the allocation side in order 
to generate a market estimate of value (as in the p cases in Kremer’s patent auction in which 
the patent is sold on the private market). The key point is that an open-access allocation is 
possible for at least some IP-incentivized knowledge goods (in Kremer’s proposal, the 1 – p 
cases where the government purchases the patents at the auction-determined price). This 
conclusion contrasts with the discussion that follows regarding the matching of non-IP inno-
vation incentives with IP allocation mechanisms, where a one-to-one match is possible. That 
is, a state could rely entirely on a non-IP innovation incentive (e.g., the production of 
knowledge goods in a government-run lab) and then allocate access entirely through monop-
oly pricing. But even there, the access allocation mechanism might create feedback effects on 
the innovation incentive. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text. 
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non-IP innovation incentives might be superior in some cases,
65
 but why might 
a policy maker choose an IP-based access allocation mechanism despite its 
greater allocative inefficiency? One reason, as noted above, is that monopoly 
pricing embodies a user-pays principle that might be distributively preferable for 
some knowledge goods, such as lifestyle drugs or luxury products.
66
 But this sort 
of matching can also promote efficiency in at least two circumstances: first, when 
monopoly power mitigates collective action problems with respect to commer-
cialization; and second, when consumption of the relevant knowledge good gen-
erates negative externalities that make open access undesirable. 
We start with the commercialization concern. Imagine that an innovator ap-
plies for and obtains a patent covering a promising new pharmaceutical com-
pound that treats cancer in mice. The government then buys the patent—either 
in a bilaterally negotiated exchange or through an auction process along the lines 
of the Kremer proposal—and places the patent in the public domain. One might 
think that the access allocation problem has been solved because the knowledge 
good is now available to all consumers at zero cost. The problem is that the pa-
tented drug is still a long way from market. Before the drug becomes available 
to consumers, it must go through several expensive clinical trials to demonstrate 
safety and efficacy in humans.
67
 But for-profit firms are unwilling to invest in 
drug development unless they can, at the very least, recoup their costs.
68
 As long 
as the patent is in the public domain, other firms have the option to free-ride off 
the efforts of the first firm that invests in commercializing the drug.
69
 In sum, 
the same collective action problem that exists at the knowledge-generation stage 
may be reproduced at the commercialization stage. 
 
65. See supra Part I. 
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
67. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-on Phar-
maceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 302 & 
nn.10-12 (2010) (citing research and development cost estimates for an approved drug in the 
range of one hundred million to one billion dollars). 
68. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
503, 545-47 (2009). 
69. See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 271, 288 (2017) (discussing the “first-commercializer disadvantage”). The first company 
to shepherd a drug through the FDA approval process does receive a period of patent-like 
regulatory exclusivity through the FDA, although this added incentive is generally insufficient 
to spur commercialization absent sufficient patent protection. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1130-
31 (2015) (describing the various exclusivity regimes for general small-molecule drugs, orphan 
drugs, and biologic drugs); Roin, supra note 68, at 566-67 (discussing evidence that these 
exclusivity periods are inadequate). 
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To be sure, commercialization involves incentives as well as allocation. The 
patent for the knowledge that the new compound treats cancer in mice serves to 
allocate access to this initial knowledge good and to incentivize the production 
of a follow-on knowledge good, namely, whether the compound also treats can-
cer in humans. So instead of characterizing this as a non-IP innovation incentive 
matched with monopoly pricing as an allocation mechanism, we might describe 
this as the sequential use of non-IP and IP innovation incentives at different 
junctures in the knowledge-good production process. Our point is simply that 
even if the initial knowledge good is funded through a non-IP innovation incen-
tive (such as a grant), one still might want to use IP to limit access to this good 
rather than making it available to all. 
The argument made in the previous paragraphs is not a new one. Austrian-
American economist Fritz Machlup made a similar point in his now-famous 1958 
report to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the patent system: 
The thesis that patent protection is needed as a stimulus to invention has 
been first supplemented and then replaced by the thesis that it is needed 
as a stimulus to the practical use of new inventions in industry. Financing 
the work that leads to the making of an invention may be a relatively 
small venture compared with that of financing its introduction, because 
costly development work, experimentation in production and experi-
mentation in marketing may be needed before the commercial exploita-
tion of the invention can begin. The risks involved may be too great to 
be undertaken except under the shelter of a monopoly grant.
70
 
Machlup saw this commercialization rationale as an alternative justification 
for the patent system. Our analysis unpacks this argument and expands it to 
other forms of IP, making clear that the commercialization rationale can be a 
justification for IP as a mechanism for allocating access to an embryonic 
knowledge good, not a justification for IP as an incentive for the initial innova-
tion. That is, the commercialization rationale for IP does not tell us anything 
about whether IP should be used to spur discovery at an earlier stage of the 
knowledge-good production process. It would be perfectly consistent with the 
commercialization rationale to use non-IP innovation incentives (such as prizes, 
grants, and tax credits) to facilitate the discovery of new drugs, and then to use 
IP to encourage pharmaceutical firms to commercialize those drugs. 
 
70. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15, at 36-
37 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Professor Fritz Machlup); see also Ted Sichelman, Com-
mercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010) (arguing that traditional patents cannot serve 
these commercialization goals and proposing a new “commercialization” patent). 
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To some extent, this is what the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 does.
71
 Before 1980, 
recipients of federal research grants such as universities faced a patchwork of 
policies governing whether they could obtain patents on resulting inventions.
72
 
Bayh-Dole established a uniform rule that government contractors may patent 
these inventions, and the funding agency may file any patents that the grant re-
cipient chooses not to pursue.
73
 The lesser-known Stevenson-Wydler Act of 
1980 sets similar rules for research at federal laboratories.
74
 If we recall Figure 1, 
the innovation incentive provided by a federal research grant falls into the upper 
left-hand box (ex ante, government-set). Yet Bayh-Dole allows universities and 
other grantees to exercise monopoly power over the resulting innovation—an IP 
allocation mechanism. To be sure, Bayh-Dole also alters the payoffs for univer-
sity researchers who produce new knowledge goods, because these researchers 
can receive some of the profits from university patents. In this respect, as we 
discuss below,
75
 Bayh-Dole leads to the mixing of IP and non-IP innovation in-
centives. But the primary justification for Bayh-Dole has always been the com-
mercialization benefit of exclusive patent rights: the Act matches the non-IP in-
novation incentive of government grants with an IP-based allocation mechanism 
so as to ensure that universities will collaborate with industry to bring new 
knowledge goods to market.
76
 
One of us, in work with Ian Ayres,
77
 has questioned the case for Bayh-Dole 
as a mechanism for promoting the commercialization of at least some university-
generated knowledge goods. The commercialization rationale rests on the as-
sumption that a firm will invest in bringing university-generated knowledge 
goods to market only if the university can promise the firm that it will enjoy 
exclusive rights over the new knowledge good for some time. Yet on average 
sixty percent or more of university licenses issued each year are nonexclusive,
78
 
suggesting that at least in many cases, firms do not need the carrot of exclusivity 
 
71. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
72. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671-91 (1996). 
73. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (c) (2018). 
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (2018). 
75. See infra Section III.B. 
76. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 69, at 286-90. Bayh-Dole also affects allocation by requiring 
that licensees manufacture “substantially in the United States” unless domestic manufacture 
is infeasible. 35 U.S.C. § 204. 
77. Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 69, at 275-77, 288-90. 
78. See id. at 275 n.16 (citing Statistics Access for Technology Transfer (STATT) Database, ASS’N U. 
TECH. MANAGERS, https://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases
/statt-database-(1) [https://perma.cc/AL2E-VKWJ]). 
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in order to invest in commercializing university-generated knowledge goods. In 
other instances, the commercialization rationale may have greater force. As Mark 
Lemley has put it, “the validity of commercialization theory depends a great deal 
on the industry in question and the particular nature of the technology.”
79
 To 
distinguish these cases, grant recipients could be required to use a “market test” 
to solicit information about the importance of exclusivity for commercialization 
of a given patent.
80
 Before exclusively licensing a federally funded invention, 
grantees could conduct an auction to determine whether any firm will commit 
to commercializing the invention for less exclusivity. For example, a firm that 
will take a five-year license would beat another firm that will not invest in the 
technology without ten years of exclusive rights.
81
 In any case, the key point for 
present purposes is that one can reject the commercialization rationale and still 
embrace the use of IP at earlier stages of the knowledge-good production pro-
cess. Alternatively, one can favor non-IP innovation incentives at the outset while 
adopting the commercialization rationale for IP later on. 
In the pharmaceutical context—the primary domain in which Bayh-Dole op-
erates—there is, however, something peculiar about Bayh-Dole’s matching of 
non-IP innovation incentives with IP-based allocation mechanisms. We have ar-
gued above that the case for ex ante incentives such as direct spending and re-
fundable tax credits is strongest with respect to capital-intensive projects for 
which the federal government enjoys an advantage in raising funds. Yet the bulk 
of the cost of developing a new drug comes at the post-discovery stage—specif-
ically, in clinical trials that are designed to comply with federal FDA regula-
tions.
82
 One might think that the federal government would have an advantage 
over private industry in bringing new pharmaceutical products to market, given 
its unique ability to raise capital and especially given that the challenge of bring-
ing a new drug to market largely involves navigating federal regulations. It is 
harder to explain why the federal government would enjoy a comparative ad-
vantage in choosing projects to finance at the initial drug development stage. 
A potential response to the previous point is that market institutions outper-
form political institutions at selecting promising new drugs for further develop-
ment and then connecting patients with those new products. As Benjamin Roin 
 
79. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
611, 622-23 (2008). 
80. Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 69, at 279-80, 301-16. 
81. Id. at 301-16. 
82. See Bruce Booth, A Billion Here, a Billion There: The Cost of Making a Drug Revisited, LIFE SCI 
VC (Nov. 21, 2014), https://lifescivc.com/2014/11/a-billion-here-a-billion-there-the-cost-of 
-making-a-drug-revisited [https://perma.cc/T9SG-8CUV]. 
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writes, the government “lacks the capacity to reliably develop” new drugs out-
side the patent system because “it would be unable to identify most of them or 
complete their preclinical development, has a history of grossly underfunding 
clinical research, and usually fails to effectively disseminate knowledge of pub-
licly developed therapies to medical practitioners.”
83
 Roin adds that “[t]he hu-
man and technological capital necessary for developing a lead compound into a 
drug ready for clinical trials and wide-scale production is located almost exclu-
sively in the private sector,”
84
 which enjoys an advantage over the government 
in marketing new products to doctors and patients.
85
 This is a valid defense of 
the current division of labor between government and industry, with the gov-
ernment taking a lead role in financing early-stage development and private-sec-
tor firms focusing more often on the post-discovery stage of the process. One 
might ask, though, whether the existing distribution of capabilities reflects in-
herent institutional characteristics or path dependency. The government cur-
rently lacks the capacity to develop and commercialize new drugs, but that might 
not mean that the public sector would underperform the private sector on these 
dimensions if the government committed itself to a more active role in develop-
ment and commercialization. 
In any event, our goal here is not to justify the particular match that Bayh-
Dole accomplishes but instead to explain why policy makers might want to 
match non-IP incentives for initial innovation with IP-based allocation mecha-
nisms at later stages. One such reason, discussed above, is that policy makers 
prefer an ex ante or government-set incentive for idea generation but believe that 
exclusive rights over access are necessary for commercialization. A second reason 
is that policy makers may choose to grant monopoly power to an individual or 
firm when they worry about the externalities that otherwise might be generated 
through too-widespread consumption of a new knowledge good. 
The field of antibiotics presents a potential application. A number of scholars 
have suggested that a firm with long-lasting monopoly power over an antibiotic 
might have an incentive to manage the distribution of the antibiotic so as to min-
imize the spread of resistance.
86
 If overuse of an antibiotic today undermines its 
 
83. Roin, supra note 68, at 560-61. 
84. Id. at 562. 
85. See id. at 563. 
86. See, e.g., Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 611, 643-59 (2005); Ramanan Laxminarayan, How Broad Should the Scope of Anti-
biotic Patents Be?, 84 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1287, 1287-88 (2002); Anup Malani, Supply-Side 
Strategies for Tackling Resistance, in EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE GROW-
ING THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 133, 141 n.20 (Ramanan Laxminarayan & Anup 
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efficacy down the road, then the profit-maximizing monopolist with a long time 
horizon might choose to restrict access today in order to ensure that the antibi-
otic will continue to be useful in the future. Patent lives for antibiotics might be 
extended beyond the standard twenty-year term so as to motivate monopolists 
to consider consequences far into the future.
87
 
Importantly, this argument for using monopoly power as an allocation 
mechanism is orthogonal to the choice of innovation incentive for antibiotics. 
We can imagine an arrangement in which NIH researchers develop an antibiotic 
and then transfer rights to a firm that manages access so as to minimize re-
sistance. In this scenario, the innovation incentive would be purely ex ante and 
government-set, while access allocation would be governed by an IP-like mo-
nopoly mechanism.
88
 We can also imagine a match between a prize for the de-
velopment of an antibiotic that treats a particular bacterial infection and a gov-
ernment-granted monopoly for the drug postdevelopment. Again, the idea 
would be to leverage the benefits of government-set rewards while allowing a 




Malani eds., 2007). But see Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Re-
sistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 102-19 
(2005) (critiquing Eric Kades’s proposal and similar suggestions). 
87. One might describe this as the access-allocation analogue to Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory. 
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-
71 (1977). For another example of how information might decrease in value with use, see Wil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 
487-88 (2003), which argues that if anyone could use Mickey Mouse, then “the value of the 
character might plummet” because the public would “rapidly tire of” him and “his image 
would be blurred.” 
88. Under current law, unlike our hypothetical scenario, the incentive would not be purely ex ante 
because the NIH researchers would receive a share of the patent royalties (the first $2000 each 
year and at least fifteen percent thereafter). See 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2018). 
89. A somewhat similar example comes from Dean Hamer, a longtime molecular biologist at the 
NIH, who identified an apparent link between a genetic marker on the X chromosome and 
homosexuality. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 573, 587-88 (2006). Hamer was motivated by non-IP innovation incentives—he received 
an ex ante, government-set reward for his work (an NIH researcher’s salary), and he made 
clear that he had no intention of commercializing his discovery. Indeed, Hamer suggested that 
by patenting the “gay gene,” he could prevent the development of technologies that might 
test for homosexuality in fetuses. See DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DE-
SIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 219 (1994). As in the 
antibiotics example, Hamer sought to use IP as a mechanism to limit access to a knowledge 
good that, if disseminated widely, might cause grave harm. Unlike the antibiotics example, 
though, little is accomplished through monopoly power here that could not be achieved 
through an outright ban. 
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One might ask why policy makers would ever choose monopoly, as opposed 
to regulation or Pigouvian taxation, as a mechanism for controlling access to a 
knowledge good when use or overuse is potentially harmful. Under certain cir-
cumstances, political-economy considerations supply an answer. Imagine two 
different proposals for restricting access to an antibiotic: (1) a regime in which 
the government sets a tax on antibiotics to discourage low-value uses; and (2) a 
regime in which the government confers a monopoly upon a pharmaceutical 
company so that the company can allocate access. The first approach lacks a nat-
ural constituency: future patients bear the costs of antibiotics overuse, but they 
might not know today that their future interests are being adversely affected. 
The second approach, by contrast, enlists as a political ally the pharmaceutical 
company that stands to profit from monopoly power. In this respect, the case for 
IP as an allocation mechanism mirrors the argument for using cap-and-trade 
schemes (with permits distributed to industry incumbents) rather than carbon 
taxes to control greenhouse gas emissions.
90
 The argument is that externality-
regulation proposals are easier to pass through a political process when a well-
resourced interest group believes that it can extract rents in the event of the pro-
posal’s passage. 
We also might imagine a similar argument based on the time-inconsistent 
preferences of policy makers. At the outset, policy makers may recognize that the 
judicious rationing of access to antibiotics is socially desirable. But when a con-
stituent suffering from a treatable infection demands access to an antibiotic, re-
jecting that demand may be a political nonstarter even if it is the welfare-max-
imizing move in the long run. Assigning a monopoly to a private entity may serve 
as a hands-tying strategy for policy makers who are aware of their own (or their 
successors’) time inconsistency. More generally, IP may prove preferable to mar-
ginal-cost pricing as an allocation mechanism when the private sector enjoys an 
advantage over the government in preserving product effectiveness.
91
 
C. Mixing IP and Non-IP Tools 
In the previous Section, we considered the possibility of matching an IP-
based innovation incentive with a non-IP allocation mechanism, or vice versa. 
The key point was that IP and non-IP tools can be used on different sides of the 
 
90. See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 
22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 348-51 (1998). 
91. See Stephen P.A. Brown & William C. Gruben, Intellectual Property Rights and Product Effec-
tiveness, FED. RES. BANK DALL. ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 1997, at 15, 16, 19 (noting that 
fungicides, herbicides, and pesticides—in addition to antibiotics—are products whose “effec-
tiveness diminishes with cumulative use,” and observing that “the case for protecting intel-
lectual property is substantially stronger” with respect to these products). 
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incentive/allocation divide. Policy makers also can—and often do—mix IP and 
non-IP tools on the same side of the divide. That is, they can mix IP and non-IP 
innovation incentives, or IP and non-IP allocation mechanisms. This Section 
considers when and why policy makers might choose to use such mixed regimes. 
1. Mixing on the Innovation-Incentive Side 
Our analysis of mixing on the innovation-incentive side of the incentive/ac-
cess divide brings us back again to the taxonomy from Figure 1. First, we con-
sider mixing IP and non-IP mechanisms for reward setting. We then consider 
mixing mechanisms for reward timing. 
a. Reward Setting 
Government-set rewards rely on political institutions to estimate the social 
value of new knowledge goods. Market-set rewards rely, as the name implies, on 
markets to do the same. Committed socialists and committed libertarians—and 
certainly everyone in between—can agree that both political institutions and 
market institutions generate noisy estimates of social value. Under a range of 
circumstances, the best approach may be to mix the imperfect estimates arising 
from politics and markets rather than rely on one source only. Indeed, even if we 
have reason to believe that one estimate is generally superior to the other, mixing 
the two estimates (with more weight given to the superior estimate) still may 
make more sense than relying on one alone. 
Before turning to why this is so, we should consider what we are trying to 
estimate. The goal of innovation policy on the incentive side is generally to trans-
fer resources from consumers to producers in amounts large enough to ensure 
the pursuit of welfare-enhancing research projects. Rational, self-interested pro-
ducers of knowledge goods will invest only until their own marginal benefit 
equals their marginal cost of production, and they may fail to take into account 
the benefits that others enjoy from the knowledge goods in question.
92
 Govern-
ments can facilitate transfers to potential innovators—either enhancing their re-
wards or reducing their costs—so as to strengthen their incentives to pursue so-
cially beneficial research and development projects. This does not mean that full 
internalization of benefits is necessary or desirable; a society may choose to allow 
 
92. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 170 (discussing this phenomenon with respect to na-
tion-state producers of knowledge goods). 
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(and encourage) some level of spillovers.
93
 It does mean that innovation policy 
will generally aim to enlarge the payoffs for producers of knowledge goods either 
through market-set rewards (such as patents and tax preferences) or through 
government-set rewards (such as prizes and grants). 
At first glance, patents might appear superior to alternative reward mecha-
nisms because patent rents are closely correlated with social value. Yet there are 
numerous reasons that the net present value of future monopoly profits may di-
verge from the social value of a new knowledge good. Perhaps most obviously, 
the relevant knowledge good may generate positive externalities, such that a con-
sumer’s willingness to pay will be less than the good’s social value.
94
 For exam-
ple, a consumer who switches from coal power to a new solar-panel technology 
generates a positive externality (a reduction in carbon emissions and other forms 
of pollution), but absent a comprehensive system of Pigouvian taxation or cap-
and-trade, the consumer is unlikely to capture the full social benefits of her 
switch. The consumer’s willingness to pay is likely to reflect the benefits of the 
new solar panel technology to her but not to the rest of society, and so the price 
that the patent holder can charge will be less than the full social value. Moreover, 
we might think that the social value of a knowledge good is greater than potential 
consumers’ ability to pay. For example, an individual with no ability to borrow 
might have only ten thousand dollars to spend on a life-saving therapy, but most 
readers likely believe that society should place a higher value on that individual’s 
survival.
95
 And as Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed have emphasized, patent re-
wards may fail to match social value because of the problem of nonexcludability. 
For example, the use of checklists dramatically reduced medical errors, and yet 
the researchers who developed the checklist “technology” cannot capture the full 
 
93. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). Fur-
thermore, if the production function for a good is discontinuous, such that a producer is 
simply deciding whether to invest the fixed costs of a project or not, society needs only to 
ensure that the producer’s private benefits outweigh the private costs. For example, suppose 
a clinical trial for a new cancer drug will cost $2. And suppose it has a ten percent chance of 
success, in which case there is a $50 social benefit, but the producer can reap only $10 absent 
government intervention (making an expected social benefit of $5 and expected private ben-
efit of $1). To ensure that the producer undertakes this welfare-enhancing project, the gov-
ernment need not give the producer the full social benefit—it need only provide either a $1 
reduction in cost for a producer who is willing to pursue the project, or a $10 reward if the 
project is successful. 
94. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection in (Clean/Green) Tech-
nology Transfer, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 487, 489 (2010). 
95. See Kapczynski, supra note 2, at 999-1000. 
the yale law journal 128:544  2019 
576 
value of the benefits that their innovation has yielded.
96
 Conversely, due to mis-
calibration or misapplication of patent doctrines, patents may yield rewards that 




Just as market-set rewards may undercompensate or overcompensate inven-
tors,
98
 government-set rewards like grants and prizes may diverge from social 
value due to failures of the “political market.” Politicians accountable to voters 
(and other government officials accountable to politicians who are accountable 
to voters) may favor research projects that pursue headline-grabbing achieve-
ments (like a mission to Mars
99
 or the discovery of a new fundamental parti-
cle
100
) rather than projects with potentially more significant but less salient social 
benefits (like a reduction in traffic fatalities). Moreover, political processes may 
 
96. See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 
YALE L.J. 1900, 1902-03 (2013). 
97. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590, 1603-12 (2011) (explaining why the current “cognitive” approach to patent 
law’s nonobviousness requirement can lead to patents being granted for inventions that 
would have been created even without the inducement of a patent); Michael D. Frakes & 
Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: 
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 625-31 (2015) (providing evidence of 
structural biases that cause the Patent and Trademark Office to mistakenly grant invalid pa-
tents); William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 385 (2016) (arguing that patent damages awards often overcompensate 
patentees). 
98. The prior paragraph focused on failures in patent rewards, but R&D tax credits—in tandem 
with non-IP forms of market power—provide a similar market-based reward, which may in 
some cases be closer to the socially optimal transfer than patent rents. See Hemel & Ouellette, 
supra note 4, at 330-31. 
99. For one front-page story, see Kenneth Chang, Mars Shows Signs of Having Flowing Water, Pos-
sible Niches for Life, NASA Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/09/29/science/space/mars-life-liquid-water.html [https://perma.cc/T9ZE-75DT]. 
100. Even the failure of scientists at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)’s 
Large Hadron Collider to discover a new elementary particle can make the New York Times. 
See Dennis Overbye, The Particle that Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/science/cern-large-hadron-collider-particle.html [https://
perma.cc/D5VN-K29Z]. The cost of the Large Hadron Collider has been well over $10 billion. 
See Alex Knapp, How Much Does It Cost to Find a Higgs Boson?, FORBES (July 5, 2012), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/07/05/how-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs 
-boson [https://perma.cc/7C4Y-CG5Y]. 
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be subject to corruption
101
 or captured by well-organized and well-resourced in-
terest groups whose own objectives diverge from those of society at large.
102
 
Even entirely well-meaning government officials may fail to adjust reward size 
to reflect social value because the information necessary to estimate social value 
with accuracy is widely dispersed, difficult to compile, and ever evolving.
103
 
If the estimates of social value generated by markets and governments are 
perfectly correlated with each other, then mixing would be unlikely to accom-
plish all that much. If, however, the estimation errors are not perfectly correlated, 
then setting rewards based on a mix of market-generated and government-gen-
erated estimates might give us more confidence in our estimate of social value 
than either estimate on its own. We might prefer, for instance, a scenario like the 
status quo in which patents last twenty years and the federal government spends 
more than one hundred billion dollars a year on research and development rather 
than a scenario in which patents last forty years and the federal government 
spends nothing on research. (Likewise, we might prefer the current combination 
over a scenario in which there are no patents but the federal government spends 
two hundred billion dollars a year on research.
104
) The idea would be that a sys-
tem that sets rewards for innovation based on a mix of market and governmental 
estimates may be likely to stray less drastically in either the overcompensatory or 




101. See Lily Fang et al., Corruption, Government Subsidies, and Innovation: Evidence from China 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25098, 2018), https://www.nber.org
/papers/w25098.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS94-CBCH] (finding evidence of corruption-
driven distortions of government R&D subsidies in China). 
102. See, e.g., Deepak Hegde & Bhaven Sampat, Can Private Money Buy Public Science? Disease Group 
Lobbying and Federal Funding for Biomedical Research, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2281 (2015); Rick Cohen, 
Universities Pay Plenty for Influence and Access Through Lobbying, NONPROFIT Q. (July 16, 2014), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/07/16/universities-pay-plenty-for-influence-and 
-access-through-lobbying [https://perma.cc/XCK6-LU4Z]. 
103. See Demsetz, supra note 35, at 19-20. 
104. The net present value of monopoly rents over a forty-year patent term may be less than two 
times the net present value of monopoly rents over a twenty-year patent term if the discount 
rate is positive. Conversely, rents over the forty-year patent term may be more than twice as 
valuable—even on a discounted cash flow basis—if the relevant invention is characterized by 
a long time-to-market such that much of the twenty-year patent period is consumed by clin-
ical trials. See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 727-30 (2014). 
105. This idea will be familiar to scholars of tax and public finance. See Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, 
and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 78 (2013) (“The deadweight loss of each distortion bears an 
exponential relationship to the size of the distortion. That means that the total loss from two 
small distortions of size X will be much less than the lost utility caused by a single distortion 
of size 2X.” (footnote omitted)). 
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There are numerous situations in which mixing noisy estimates—perhaps 
with heavier weighting of the more accurate measure—leads to a better overall 
estimate. As an example familiar to lawyers and law students, LSAT score and 
undergraduate GPA are highly imperfect predictors of 1L GPA individually, but 
combining the estimates leads to a better overall predictor.
106
 Readers who fol-
low the medical literature may know that statistical meta-analysis, which com-
bines results from separate studies (such as different clinical trials or observa-
tional studies of a drug’s efficacy), is frequently used to obtain a better estimate 
of the underlying truth.
107
 Similarly, setting reward size based on some combi-
nation of both the market-generated estimate and the political market-generated 
estimate of likely social value may lead to less divergence from a knowledge 
good’s true social value than setting reward size based only on one of those two 
estimates. 
Of course, mixing will not always yield a more accurate estimate. If under-
graduate grades were assigned at random, then predictions of 1L GPA based on 
LSAT score and undergraduate GPA would be no better than predictions based 
on LSAT score alone. Even if the additional predictor marginally improves the 
accuracy of the blended estimate, the administrative costs may still not be worth 
the increase in predictive power. For example, if predictions based on undergrad-
uate GPA alone performed almost as well as predictions based on LSAT score 
and undergraduate GPA, then the cost of administering, taking, and relying on 
the LSAT (for the law schools that are members of LSAC and for students them-
selves) might not be worth the nearly trivial benefits. Moreover, blending esti-
mates entails the additional administrative cost of determining the optimal 
blend. One might still favor innovation policy monism over pluralism on admin-
istrative-cost grounds, since multiple systems are more expensive to maintain 
and evaluate than one. 
Our claim here focuses only on whether a given state-facilitated transfer to 
knowledge-good producers is better distributed through a single policy instru-
ment or multiple policy instruments. One might be concerned, however, that 
having multiple policy instruments available would in practice inevitably in-
 
106. See Lisa C. Anthony et al., Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the 2011 and 
2012 LSAT Correlation Studies, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL 9 tbl.2 (2013), https://www.lsac
.org/docs/default-source/research-%28lsac-resources%29/tr-13-03.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9BVU-X7AC]. For an excellent overview and reanalysis of law school outcome predictors, 
see Alexia Brunet Marks & Scott A. Moss, What Predicts Law Student Success? A Longitudinal 
Study Correlating Law Student Applicant Data and Law School Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 205 (2016). 
107. See MICHAEL BORENSTEIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO META-ANALYSIS, at xxiv (2009). 
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crease the overall reward as multiple instruments are stacked without any reduc-
tion to account for the others. If, as some argue, the patent system already con-
fers excessive rewards upon innovators,
108
 then adding government-set rewards 
on top of that might make the problem even worse. This stacking concern is 
real—providing a too-rich incentive leads to unnecessary deadweight loss, 
whether from the above-marginal-cost prices on patented products or from tax-
ation.
109
 Furthermore, it is possible that the combination of two incentives could 
decrease the efficacy of either individually—if, for example, the monetary incen-
tive from patents “crowds out” the motivation of grant-funded researchers to 
pursue basic research with the highest social value.
110
 
One potential solution to these concerns would be to limit innovators to the 
maximum reward provided by any one system, such as by reducing patent re-
wards to account for nonpatent incentives.
111
 Note, however, that if govern-
ment-set rewards are targeted toward knowledge goods that the market under-
estimates, then reducing the market-generated reward for these knowledge 
goods may be counterproductive. For example, if the value of a patent reward 
Rpatent were reduced for goods that received grant funding by the value of the 
grant Rgrant (which can only be done if Rpatent > Rgrant), then the total reward for 
such goods would simply be the patent reward: Rtotal = Rgrant + (Rpatent – Rgrant) = 
Rpatent. The value of the grant would only be relevant when it is larger than the 
patent reward (Rgrant > Rpatent) such that the modified patent reward would be 
zero and Rtotal = Rgrant. The ultimate reward thus would be the larger of the patent 
reward and the grant reward: Rtotal = max(Rpatent, Rgrant). That would, in effect, be 
like treating the applicant with a strong LSAT score and a similarly strong un-
dergraduate GPA no more favorably than an applicant with the same LSAT score 
and a D average as an undergraduate. Doing so would discard much of the in-
formation that undergraduate GPA can convey. 
Further, even if patent rents are perfectly correlated with social value, they 
are likely to be systematically less than social value. This is because unless the 
patent holder can price discriminate perfectly (charging different prices to dif-
ferent buyers), the prices charged to consumers will be less than most consum-
ers’ willingness to pay. Imagine three consumers, A, B, and C, who value a 
knowledge good X at $3, $2, and $1, respectively. Assume, for simplicity, that the 
 
108. See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 97. 
109. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 314-15 (discussing these costs). 
110. See BENKLER, supra note 1, at 92-97. We have previously explained why it is difficult to make 
generalizable claims about social-psychological rewards given that they are mutable and cul-
turally contingent. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 352-55. 
111. See Ouellette, supra note 16. 
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marginal cost of manufacturing a product that embodies X is zero. Unless the 
patent holder has some way to charge different prices to A and B, the profit-
maximizing strategy is to charge $2—in which case A and B will buy the good 
and C will refrain, resulting in revenues of $4.
112
 Yet the total social value of the 
new knowledge good is $5 (the sum of the $3 value to A and the $2 value to B). 
The patent holder captures only a portion (though in this case a large portion) 
of the value created by their good. 
Why might policy makers care that patent holders do not capture the full 
social value of their innovations? Imagine that a potential innovator is deciding 
whether to pursue a project that, if successful, will yield a knowledge good for 
which the market is as described for good X. Let’s say, moreover, that the cost of 
pursuing the project is $1.01 and the chance of success is one in four. If the po-
tential innovator knows that she can capture only $4 in monopoly rents if suc-
cessful, then she will rationally decline to pursue the project (0.25 × $4 < $1.01). 
While an omnipotent social planner would direct the potential innovator to pur-
sue the project, the incentive generated by patent protection won’t do the trick 
on its own. This problem cannot be solved by uniformly increasing patent re-
wards across the board, because the size of the mismatch depends on the elastic-
ity of demand and on the patent holder’s ability to price discriminate (both of 
which vary across different knowledge goods).
113
 
To be sure, many projects still will be pursued even if potential innovators 
cannot fully internalize the benefits. Under those circumstances, full internaliza-
tion of benefits may have the undesirable consequence of increasing deadweight 
loss.
114
 Our point is simply that even if patent rents are perfectly correlated with 
social value, policy makers may have reason to increase the total incentives be-
yond those provided by patent protection alone. One way to do so is by using 
tax preferences—a non-IP mechanism—to enhance patent rents. Imagine, again, 
that the cost of pursuing a project is $1.01 and that the chance of success is one 
in four. Let’s also say that the after-tax monopoly rents in the event of success 
are $4 and that before-tax rents are $5 (due to a tax rate of 20%).
115
 Now imagine 
that the government implements a “patent box”—a regime under which patent 
 
112. Or perhaps the patent holder will charge $1.99, so that B just ever so slightly prefers buying 
the good over not buying, and the resulting revenues will be $1.99 × 2 = $3.98. 
113. Furthermore, as noted above, patent rents are not perfectly correlated with social value—even 
aside from patentees’ inability to perfectly price discriminate, they may over- or undervalue 
inventions—so any uniform shift in patent rewards would exacerbate other error costs. See 
supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
115. We will assume, to keep the arithmetic as straightforward as possible, that the cost of pursu-
ing the project is nondeductible. 
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income is taxed at a lower rate than other income.
116
 If the patent box rate is 10%, 
then the after-tax monopoly rents rise from $4 to $4.50, and the expected value 
of the inventor’s payoffs rises to $1.125, which exceeds the $1.01 cost of pursuing 
the project.
117
 Tax preferences for patent rents can leverage information gener-
ated by market institutions to push potential innovators over the margin be-
tween not pursuing and pursuing socially beneficial projects. 
In sum, there may be good reasons to mix IP and non-IP mechanisms for 
reward setting. One reason is that market institutions and political institutions 
generate different and often noisy estimates of the social value of knowledge 
goods. Combining the two estimates may yield a more accurate estimate of social 
value than relying on one alone, though one must weigh this potential benefit 
against the administrative costs of the additional incentive system. Mixing also 
might be attractive when patent rents are undercompensatory, in which case 
amping up patent rewards through tax preferences might be desirable. Under 
these circumstances, IP and non-IP rewards would not be duplicative: reliance 
on both types of mechanisms would yield policy outcomes preferable to what 
could be achieved using either alone. 
b. Reward Timing 
Mixing innovation incentives with different reward timings may yield addi-
tional benefits by preserving some of the motivational value of ex post rewards 
while also delivering a subsidy earlier in time. Consider a capital-intensive R&D 
effort in a field in which the government enjoys a comparative advantage in as-
sessing potential projects (space exploration, for example).
118
 Policy makers 
might favor an ex ante reward so that researchers do not have to devote signifi-
cant time and effort to arranging financing;
119
 but they also might worry that an 
 
116. Patent boxes have become increasingly popular in Europe and are being debated in the United 
States. See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competi-
tion, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 362-75 (2013); 
Peter R. Merrill et al., Is It Time for the United States to Consider a Patent Box?, 134 TAX NOTES 
1665 (2012). 
117. For the sake of simplicity, we assume risk neutrality. On attitudes toward risk among innova-
tors and the implications for IP, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
118. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 4, at 375-76. 
119. This is not to imply that applying for grants or tax credits is costless; for an overview of their 
administrative costs, see id. at 362-64. Conceivably, the costs of applying for grants or filing 
for tax credits could exceed the costs of arranging private-sector financing through venture 
capital or securities markets, though this will depend on the details of the grant application 
or tax credit qualification process and the specific characteristics of the relevant capital mar-
kets. 
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up-front grant with no ex post reward would fail to motivate researchers to work 
expeditiously—after all, if researchers have the grant money already, then what’s 
the rush?
120
 In this situation, policy makers might choose to provide a grant ex 
ante while also dangling the prospect of a prize ex post if researchers achieve 
certain milestones by specific dates.
121
 
Efforts to study the effects of increased ex post financial incentives in con-
trolled laboratory experiments have yielded ambiguous results (with higher in-
centives hurting mean performance in some cases).
122
 Even those experiments 
finding that higher incentives increased performance have not shown increases 
commensurate with higher ex post rewards.
123
 These results may cast doubt on 
the wisdom of adding an ex post reward to an ex ante grant in every instance. 
Nonetheless, we see mixing of ex ante and ex post rewards for innovation across 
a wide range of real-world settings, suggesting either that laboratory results do 
not accurately reflect reality or that sophisticated commercial actors misappre-
hend the relationship between performance and reward. Consider the popular 
inclusion of stock options in the compensation packages of employees at Silicon 
Valley tech firms.
124
 When an employee is paid in cash and in stock options, she 
receives a real-time reward for her labor (cash) plus an ex post reward that is at 
least loosely linked to performance (options). The link between performance 
 
120. In practice, direct spending can be structured to provide an incentive to finish the work on 
time, such as by withholding the final payment until delivery of some project or report, but 
this simply shifts the policy along our vertical reward-timing axis, with the corresponding 
tradeoffs between ex ante and ex post rewards. 
121. Alternatively, policy makers could use an ex post stick to penalize firms that fail to develop 
new knowledge goods or fall short of specific targets. See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Inno-
vation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781 (2015). 
122. See Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A 
Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 21-22 (1999) 
(reviewing seventy-four such experiments). 
123. Id. at 21 (“[W]hile adding some incentive to otherwise-hypothetical choices often matters, 
experiments which then multiply stakes by 2, 4, or 20 do not produce similar boosts in per-
formance.”). 
124. See Richard Harroch, How Employee Stock Options Work in Startup Companies, FORBES (Feb. 
27, 2016, 10:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/02/27/how-employee 
-stock-options-work-in-startup-companies [https://perma.cc/4JFE-XS6A] (“The spectacu-
lar success of Silicon Valley companies and the resulting economic riches of employees who 
held stock options have made Stock Option Plans a powerful motivational tool for employees 
to work for the company’s long-term success.”). On the use of options at Google (now Al-
phabet), see Katie Hafner, Google Options Put Masseuse in Crowd of Multimillionaires, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/technology/12iht-12google
.8292343.html [https://perma.cc/CU2C-8NJT]; and Cade Metz, Alphabet Could Give Google 
Employees More (Stock) Options, WIRED (Aug. 11, 2015, 4:23 PM), https://www.wired.com
/2015/08/alphabet-give-google-employees-stock-options [https://perma.cc/FW62-5RWZ]. 
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and reward is closer for firms with fewer employees, and it can be tightened fur-
ther through the use of bonuses that tie employees’ payoffs to their own perfor-
mance, rather than options that tie payoffs to company-wide performance. 
Why don’t we see Silicon Valley firms paying their employees entirely on the 
basis of performance? This is no puzzle. First, payment for performance must be 
ex post, and many employees are liquidity constrained and limited in their ability 
to borrow to finance current consumption.
125
 Alternatively, many experience 
“debt aversion” that discourages them from borrowing even when they can.
126
 
These individuals might prefer real-time payment over an ex post reward even 
when the expected dollar value of the ex post reward is greater. Second, potential 
employees may be risk averse and therefore prefer the certainty of a real-time 
payment over the unpredictability of an ex post, performance-based reward. 
Again, the firm can sweeten its compensation offer (from the potential em-
ployee’s perspective) while reducing its expected cost (from its own perspective) 
by paying a real-time wage that is decoupled from performance. 
At the same time, the firm may not want to sacrifice the incentive effects of 
ex post performance pay entirely. Under these circumstances, a compensation 
package that combines a real-time, risk-free component and an ex post, perfor-
mance-contingent component may be optimal.
127
 One way to explain this result 
is to assume that the employee values the first bit of real-time, risk-free pay more 
than the last. By moving from 0% of compensation being a real-time, risk-free 
payment to 10%, the firm sweetens the pay package from the perspective of the 
risk-averse employee more than it does by moving from 90% to 100%. Each such 
shift sacrifices some of the motivational force associated with ex post, perfor-
mance-based pay, but the 0% to 10% shift increases the overall attractiveness of 
the compensation offer (and thus draws higher quality employees) more than 
the 90% to 100% shift might. 
 
125. In theory, a capital-rich firm—or government—could provide payment for good performance 
ex ante and then demand repayment if the researcher is not successful, effectively acting as a 
private financier. But for this to work, the researcher would need to hold sufficient capital to 
repay the loan in the event of failure (thus raising the same issue of liquidity constraints) or 
would need to buy private insurance against the risk of failure (thus raising the same issue of 
transaction costs). In either case, the researcher still would be exposed to significant financial 
risk (thus raising the same issue of risk aversion). And if the researcher lacked sufficient cap-
ital to repay the loan and went without insurance, then the arrangement would not be true 
“performance pay” because the firm or government would have no way to recoup the upfront 
payment in the event of failure. 
126. See, e.g., Thomas Meissner, Intertemporal Consumption and Debt Aversion: An Experimental 
Study, 19 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 281 (2016). 
127. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of 
Intertemporal Incentives, 55 ECONOMETRICA 303 (1987) (deriving the optimal compensation 
scheme for a risk-averse agent who increases effort in response to performance incentives). 
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Mixing ex ante and ex post rewards at the level of economy-wide innovation 
policy follows the same logic that leads to mixing at the firm level in the em-
ployee-compensation context. If potential innovators are constrained by credit 
or averse to debt or risk, they may value the immediacy and certainty of an ex 
ante reward (such as a grant or an immediately refundable tax credit). And if the 
prospect of an ex post reward exerts a motivational force on innovators, then 
society may have an interest in delaying rewards and linking them to perfor-
mance. The combination of ex ante and ex post rewards represents an effort to 
achieve the best of both worlds. While we do not claim that mixing ex ante and 
ex post rewards is always optimal, we think there are strong reasons to expect 
that some combination of ex ante funding and ex post rewards will dominate 
pure ex ante or pure ex post approaches in at least some cases. 
2. Mixing on the Allocation Side 
Allocation mechanisms specify the number (n) of individuals and firms with 
the right to supply (or license) the relevant knowledge good. The most familiar 
allocation mechanisms are monopoly (n = 1) and open access (n = ∞).128 As 
noted above, however, one can imagine intermediate arrangements in which 
1 < n < ∞.129 One can also imagine an allocation mechanism in which n = 0 (i.e., 
the relevant knowledge good is banned). For example, it is generally unlawful to 
possess or transfer chemical weapons,
130
 and U.S. patents related to national se-
curity may be kept secret and limited to government use.
131
 In addition to spec-
ifying the number of authorized suppliers, allocation mechanisms also can in-
 
128. In practice, n will never really be infinity due to barriers to entry, but competitive pricing does 
not require infinite firms in a market. Also note that “monopoly” need not entail IP rights. As 
a theoretical matter, it does not matter whether the supercompetitive price is imposed by a 
private firm or by the government through a targeted sales tax on particular products. As we 
have previously explained, above-marginal-cost pricing is a necessary feature of any innova-
tion policy that imposes costs only on users of the knowledge goods, rather than having all 
taxpayers cross-subsidize each other’s knowledge-good consumption. Hemel & Ouellette, su-
pra note 4, at 349-50. 
129. See supra notes 36, 44 and accompanying text. 
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2018). 
131. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2018). Inventions related to national security may also be an exam-
ple, like antibiotics, in which an IP allocation strategy helps prevent too-widespread con-
sumption of a new knowledge good. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
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corporate taxes on—or subsidies of—knowledge goods, resulting in after-tax, 
after-subsidy prices above the monopoly price or below marginal cost.
132
 
The standard argument for open access is that marginal-cost pricing max-
imizes allocative efficiency (i.e., eliminates deadweight loss).
133
 Returning to our 
example of consumers A, B, and C who value a knowledge good X at $3, $2, and 
$1 respectively, we may note that an open-access mechanism means that all three 
consumers will have access to the knowledge good, resulting in a social surplus 
of $6. Recall that a monopoly price of $2 would cause consumer C to forego 
purchasing the good, resulting in social surplus of only $5. More generally, if the 
marginal cost of supplying the knowledge good to an additional consumer is $0, 
then (setting aside the possibility of price discrimination
134
) the price that max-
imizes allocative efficiency is $0. 
There are, however, at least two distinct reasons why we might want to set 
prices for knowledge goods above $0—in other words, why we might want to 
set n < ∞—and thereby allow a certain amount of supracompetitive pricing. The 
first reason is informational: some amount of proprietary pricing can generate 
useful information regarding the social value of an invention, feeding back on 
the appropriate incentive. The second reason is distributional: under certain cir-
cumstances and for certain goods, we might think that an allocation mechanism 
that is at least partly “user pays” is normatively desirable.
135
 
We start with the informational rationale. One advantage of monopoly pric-
ing is that the social value of a new knowledge good is otherwise difficult, if not 
 
132. On the economics of government subsidies in a monopoly market, see Douglas Gary Licht-
man, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceu-
ticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997). 
133. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 133 
(2014) (noting that “[i]nformation . . . has a marginal cost of zero, which in economic par-
lance means that for efficient uptake, it should be priced only at its cost of distribution” and 
that exclusion rights create “deadweight loss [and] . . . [d]ynamic inefficiencies”). 
134. Partial price discrimination is, in fact, prevalent in the U.S. pharmaceutical market, with phar-
maceutical manufacturers charging lower prices to Veterans Affairs hospitals and Medicaid 
providers and charging markups for brand-name drugs over generics. See Ernst R. Berndt & 
Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing and Reimbursement in US Pharmaceutical Markets, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 201, 231-37 (Patricia 
M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson eds., 2012). 
135. A third reason is derivative of the negative-externalities argument for mixing non-IP innova-
tion incentives with IP allocation mechanisms. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
Policy makers might decide that access restrictions are desirable due to the negative external-
ities of widespread use but that the access limitations that would result from full monopoly 
are undesirably severe. 




 The government might look to the number of con-
sumers who use a particular knowledge good and compensate the producer ac-
cordingly, but quantity is an imperfect measure of social value. As economists 
Glen Weyl and Jean Tirole note, a new innovation can capture a large share of 
the market but add little social value if it amounts to only an incremental im-
provement over its predecessor.
137
 If, however, a patent holder can charge a high 
price for a product, then that is evidence that consumers assign a high value to 
the product relative to substitutes. Thus, an allocation mechanism involving 
above-marginal-cost pricing generates additional information regarding social 
value, which policy makers can then use in setting the size of the innovation in-
centive. As Weyl and Tirole put it, proprietary pricing serves a “screening” func-




But the informational benefits of higher prices come with a cost: the loss of 
the allocative efficiency of an open-access mechanism. The challenge for policy 
makers is to strike a balance between benefits and costs. Weyl and Tirole argue 
that pure monopoly and pure open access are never optimal—the welfare-max-
imizing solution always lies somewhere in the intermediate range.
139
 Motivating 
Weyl and Tirole’s argument is the intuition that the first bit of market power 
increases deadweight loss only trivially, while the last bit of market power (mov-
ing from near monopoly to full monopoly) yields only trivial informational ben-
efits. That is, marginal deadweight loss increases with each additional increment 
of market power, while marginal informational benefit decreases. The optimal 
arrangement entails an interior solution, not a corner solution. 
How might an interior solution—somewhere between open access and mo-
nopoly pricing—be achieved in practice? One possibility is to grant monopoly 
power to patentees but also offer a partial subsidy for consumers. The net pur-
chase price after subtracting the subsidy would be somewhere between marginal 
 
136. As noted above, at least some IP is needed on the allocation side for some knowledge goods if 
the innovation incentive is to provide an IP-like, market-set reward. See supra note 64 and 
accompanying text. 
137. E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1971, 
1972-75 (2012). Weyl and Tirole offer the example of “Netscape Navigator during the 1990s, 
which, though widely adopted, sold at a low price because it offered little added value over its 
rivals.” Id. at 1972. 
138. Id. at 1974. This analysis does not require that market-set rewards are uniformly superior to 
government-set rewards—only that the information provided by this market-based screening 
function is useful in setting the optimal reward. On mixing noisy estimates, see supra note 105 
and accompanying text. 
139. Weyl & Tirole, supra note 137, at 1974-76. 
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cost (zero) and the profit-maximizing price that a monopolist would choose in 
an unsubsidized setting.
140
 A more intricate version of mixing might involve an 
arrangement like that proposed by Ayres and Klemperer, where patentees are 
entitled to duopoly profits rather than monopoly profits.
141
 Because duopoly 
pricing screens willingness to pay (though not quite as effectively as monopoly 
pricing), the government can then use the duopoly profit as an estimate of social 
value. But because social value will exceed the duopoly profit (by even more than 
social value exceeds the monopoly profit), the government might then magnify 
the resulting innovation incentive with a patent box. 
This proposal could be extended from duopoly to oligopoly pricing, and if a 
patent box with a reduced rate of tax is insufficient to compensate the patentee, 
then the patent box could in theory entail a negative rate of tax (i.e., the pa-
tentee’s after-tax income would exceed her pretax income). Alternatively, the 
government could supplement the payoff to innovators by mixing IP and non-
IP incentives. These intermediate allocation solutions avoid the full deadweight 
loss of monopoly pricing while still generating some informational benefits. 
This is not to say that mixed allocation regimes are necessarily superior to 
pure monopoly and pure open access for all knowledge goods under all circum-
stances. One might acknowledge the desirability of mixing in theory but oppose 
it in practice based on administrative cost concerns; after all, two access regimes 
are more expensive to implement, evaluate, and police than one.
142
 One might 
also oppose any deviation from the open-access model for knowledge goods on 
ethical grounds. Consider, for example, John Willinsky’s argument that “[a] 
commitment to the value and quality of research carries with it a responsibility 
to extend the circulation of such work as far as possible and ideally to all who are 
interested in it and all who might profit by it.”
143
 
Alternatively, different distributional principles might weigh against mixing 
any subsidies into allocative policy. For example, suppose that the government 
can accurately estimate the social value of some new knowledge good. This 
would seem to suggest that the optimal allocation mechanism is one of open 
access because there is no information to be gained from proprietary pricing. The 
 
140. Id. at 1992-93. 
141. Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 44, at 1031-32. 
142. Any of the above examples of mixed allocation regimes would entail the usual administrative 
costs of the patent system (including the costs of initial examination and of subsequent liti-
gation) plus the costs of administering a subsidy, patent box, auction, or other policy. 
143. JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND 
SCHOLARSHIP, at xii (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
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government can minimize deadweight loss through non-IP innovation incen-
tives such as prizes, grants, or tax credits, and it can set the size of the reward 
correctly without relying on observed willingness to pay. But consider a case 
where the relevant knowledge good is a luxury product consumed primarily by 
the wealthy. Why, one might fairly ask, should lower- and middle-income tax-
payers bear any portion of the cost of, say, a new yachting technology?
144
 Even 
though the knowledge good may be socially beneficial, the benefit accrues to a 
segment of society that is not ordinarily thought to be the proper beneficiary of 
government redistribution. Since the government has only finite resources, the 
allocative-efficiency benefits of open access must be weighed against the distri-
butional consequences of using public funds to pay for advances that benefit only 
the rich. Under these circumstances, policy makers might decide that they still 
want to rely on a user-pays model to some degree, though perhaps not entirely. 
To be sure, an alternative approach might be to combine a non-IP innovation 
incentive and an open-access allocation mechanism with adjustments to the tax-
and-transfer system that offset the distributional consequences of the subsidy 
for luxury goods. Yet if there are insuperable political obstacles to tax-and-trans-
fer reform,
145
 then policy makers might decide that the best available option is 
one in which users pay some, if not all, of the cost of the innovator’s reward. 
In sum, for informational as well as distributional reasons, policy makers 
might prefer intermediate allocation solutions over pure monopoly (n = 1) and 
pure open access (n = ∞). Monopoly and open access do not exhaust the set of 
possible allocation regimes; indeed, they barely scratch the surface. Policy mak-
ers facing a diverse set of challenges may thus have good reasons for adopting 
mixed allocation mechanisms that entail some amount of proprietary pricing 
short of full monopoly. 
D. Layering IP and Non-IP Systems 
We have already seen that policy makers can match IP-based innovation in-
centives with non-IP allocation mechanisms (and vice versa), and that they can 
 
144. On technological innovations in yachting, see Antonio Regalado, Steve Jobs Lives on at the Pa-
tent Office, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 27, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532841
/steve-jobs-lives-on-at-the-patent-office [https://perma.cc/TN9N-LVGA]; and With This 
Patent Does Steve Jobs Own the Future of Yacht Navigation?, OCEAN NEWS (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.oceanofnews.com/steve-jobs-yacht [https://perma.cc/EM4Y-VBW3]. 
145. See generally Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and 
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (challenging the assumption that the undesirable 
distributional effects of “welfare-maximizing” policies can always be offset through tax-and-
transfer adjustments). 
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mix IP and non-IP tools on either side of the incentive/allocation divide. But that 
does not exhaust the possibilities of innovation policy pluralism. Another im-
portant option is to use different innovation policies at different jurisdictional 
levels. Most notably, policy makers can use non-IP incentives and allocation 
mechanisms domestically while using the international IP framework globally—
that is, to layer IP at the supranational level and non-IP or hybrid regimes at the 
national level.
146
 Countries can also layer supranational non-IP regimes with na-
tional IP law, but international IP law is the primary, though not exclusive,
147
 
innovation policy employed at the supranational level. 
All members of the World Trade Organization (164 nations in total) are 
bound by the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which requires all but the least-developed nations to protect 
the IP rights of all TRIPS members at or above a basic level.
148
 For example, 
TRIPS members must offer twenty-year patents in “all fields of technology” to 
inventors in any member country, including for novel pharmaceuticals and food 
products that some countries had previously excluded from patentability.
149
 
TRIPS is a significant step in the longer trend of IP standards gradually being 





146. Camilla Hrdy notes that as a descriptive and normatively desirable matter, state and local gov-
ernments often offer subsidies to local innovators who can then seek patent protection on a 
national scale. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1301 (2017). Our argument moves this dynamic up one level: national governments often offer 
subsidies to domestic innovators who can then seek patent protection on an international 
scale. 
147. On multinational and transnational efforts employing non-IP innovation incentives, see 
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 231-32. Examples include the International Space Station, 
CERN, and the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. See id. 
148. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 29, 
2016), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma
.cc/VL8T-P4VV]; Responding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e
.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC5S-HQ7C]. 
149. TRIPS art. 27(1), supra note 148, at 311. For example, prior to TRIPS, India excluded patents 
on “substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug.” 
Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in 
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1576 & n.21 (2009) (quoting Patents Act, 
No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE § 5 (2005), vol. 15). 
150. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 993, 995 (2002). 
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But we think many IP scholars have overlooked the point that this interna-
tional framework and domestic IP policy are largely separable. Even the strong-
est international IP regime does not lead ineluctably to the use of IP-based inno-
vation incentives or allocation mechanisms at the domestic level.
151
 On the 
incentives side, countries can still comply with TRIPS while using non-IP tools 
to encourage domestic innovation. For example, a country could provide incen-
tives only though grants and prizes conditioned on relinquishing IP rights, while 
the national government itself retains revenues from licensing the knowledge 
good in other countries. Or—as is more common—countries can both subsidize 
the domestic production of knowledge goods through grants and tax credits and 
purchase domestic patent rights from the producer, while still allowing the pro-
ducer to collect overseas profits (with the state potentially collecting some of 
those profits through a tax on the domestic producer).
152
 
On the allocation side, countries can (and often do) choose nonprice mech-
anisms—closer to open access than to proprietary pricing—to distribute 
knowledge goods at the domestic level. For instance, a country that wants to 
make a patented pharmaceutical available to its own citizens at zero or marginal 
cost can purchase a license from the patentee and pay for the license using funds 
raised through broad-based taxation. Countries with single-payer health care 
systems generally follow a version of this model, respecting the patentee’s IP 
rights while avoiding domestic deadweight loss from proprietary pricing.
153
 
Even countries without single-payer health care, such as the United States, often 
 
151. Our discussion here and in the following paragraph draws from Hemel & Ouellette, supra 
note 5, at 173-74. 
152. For an explanation of how Bayh-Dole regimes can help countries internalize foreign benefits 
of domestic R&D spending, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond 
Borders, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 282 (2017). 
153. Countries’ autonomy to use alternative allocation tools will be limited, however, if their in-
vestments can be dispersed to consumers in other countries through international resale mar-
kets. The Supreme Court recently changed the U.S. rules such that foreign sales now exhaust 
U.S. patents and copyrights. See Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 
(2017); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). As we explain in a separate 
essay, exhaustion of international IP rights undermines a key benefit of the current interna-
tional IP system. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of 
International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17 (2016). It may be possible, 
however, to recapture some of these benefits through contractual restrictions. See Daniel 
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Licensing in the Shadow of Impression Products, MEDIUM: 
WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (May 31, 2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source 
-derived/licensing-in-the-shadow-of-impression-products-with-lisa-larrimore-ouellette 
-9bbf8c350c65 [https://perma.cc/H6WV-MJV6]. 
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allocate access to patented pharmaceutical products through nonmarket mecha-
nisms (e.g., the Medicaid program).
154
 
We have argued that rather than dictating domestic policy, the role of inter-
national IP law is to provide a serviceable (if imperfect) framework for cost shar-
ing among countries that produce and consume knowledge goods. Without such 
a framework, certain goods for which demand transcends national boundaries 
would be underproduced.
155
 Absent an international cost-sharing mechanism, 
rational and self-interested countries will finance knowledge goods only up to 
the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to their own citizens, 
rather than the marginal benefit to all people everywhere.
156
 International IP law 
addresses this underinvestment problem by ensuring that when Country A pro-
duces a knowledge good that benefits consumers in Country B, Country B will 
provide at least some compensation to Country A. As a general matter, TRIPS 
prohibits Country B from using the Country-A-produced knowledge good with-
out first reaching some sort of cost-sharing agreement with Country A (such as 
a license from the private producer in Country A, who may be separately subsi-
dized or taxed by Country A’s government). In this respect, TRIPS functions as 
an “agreement to agree”: signatory states commit to reaching an arrangement 
under which knowledge-good consumers share costs with knowledge-good 
producers. The agreement to agree operates against the background rule that 
absent a further arrangement, the consumer state cannot use the knowledge 
 
154. The allocation-only aspect of programs such as Medicaid leaves room for policy makers to 
tailor innovation incentives without fundamentally altering the consumer experience. See gen-
erally Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) (discussing how Medicaid could be modified to more deliber-
ately incentivize innovation). 
155. As we emphasize in earlier work, not all knowledge goods are “global public goods”; for some, 
demand is primarily domestic. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 170 n.13. And in some 
cases, demand for a knowledge good may cross borders, but the good addresses a problem so 
important to a single country that the country’s government will invest quite heavily (though 
perhaps still suboptimally) even without any cross-border cost-sharing mechanism—e.g., 
flood control technology in the Netherlands. See Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a 
Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world
/europe/netherlands-sets-model-of-flood-prevention.html [https://perma.cc/MX27-8P2F] 
(discussing Dutch preeminence in flood-related research). 
156. Our prediction that states will underinvest in the provision of global public goods relies on a 
model of states as rational egoists; other accounts of state behavior may generate divergent 
predictions. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 201-14 (drawing from the international 
political economy literature and discussing realist, constructivist, and public choice models of 
state behavior). 
the yale law journal 128:544  2019 
592 




While cost-sharing through TRIPS can address the global underinvestment 
problem, international IP law is not the only possible cost-sharing framework. 
We can imagine a global prize fund or a global R&D organization, financed by 
mandatory national contributions, that would also provide for cost sharing 
among producer and consumer states. Yet international IP law has the advantage 
of establishing a link between the benefits to the consumer country and the size 
of the transfer from the consumer country to the producer country. Under inter-
national IP law, no country ever needs to pay for knowledge goods it doesn’t use. 
No such assurance would exist with respect to a global prize fund or global R&D 
organization. Such an institution might channel more of its funding to “first-
world problems” than to problems facing less-developed nations. (Indeed, if 
wealthier nations control the institutional levers of power, then this prediction 
seems not just plausible but likely.
158
) 
Importantly, the argument for using international IP law as a cross-border 
cost-sharing mechanism does not depend on whether individual countries use 
IP to incentivize innovation or allocate access to knowledge goods at the domes-
tic level. International and domestic innovation policy choices are separable. So 
too, countries can be innovation policy pluralists at the domestic level even while 
the international regime is exclusively IP-oriented. One might call this “second-
order innovation policy pluralism”: a mix of pluralism at one level and monism 
 
157. This is true as a general matter but not universally: Article 30 of TRIPS allows a signatory 
state to “provide limited exceptions” to patent rights, and Article 31 allows compulsory licens-
ing of a patent for “adequate remuneration . . . taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization.” TRIPS arts. 30-31, supra note 148, at 312-14. Except in cases of “national emer-
gency,” “circumstances of extreme urgency,” or “cases of public non-commercial use,” a sig-
natory state must make “efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms” before it can make unauthorized use of the patent. Id. art. 31(b). From 
January 1995 to June 2011, there were twenty-four instances in which countries threatened to 
issue compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, most of which ended in either compulsory li-
censes or voluntary price reductions. Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Li-
censing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, PLOS MED., Jan. 
2012, at 1, 4 tbl.1. Note also that countries retain substantial autonomy in how they define the 
substantive standards of patent protection and in how much they allow patent rights to be 
cabined by related bodies of law such as antitrust. See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & RO-
CHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012) (describing these flexibilities). 
158. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 5, at 242. 




 The key point is that innovation policy choices at the international 
level need not dictate decisions at the national level, or vice versa. 
i i i .  innovation policy pluralism in practice:  the case of 
pharmaceuticals 
So far, we have explained why policy makers might choose to match, mix, 
and layer IP and non-IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms. In 
this Part, we seek to show that innovation policy pluralism not only offers a nor-
matively desirable approach under a wide range of circumstances but also pro-
vides a descriptively accurate account of the world in which we live, and thus a 
useful analytic language for describing the real world of innovation policy. We 
focus on the pharmaceutical industry, the so-called poster child for the patent 
system.
160
 We argue that the pharmaceutical industry is instead a poster child 
for innovation policy pluralism, with matching, mixing, and layering aplenty. 
To be clear, our intent is not to provide a detailed account of the many com-
plicated legal regimes governing pharmaceutical innovation. There are numer-
ous policy levers beyond patents through which drug manufacturers can main-







 Our goal is to show how these various IP, IP-
like, and non-IP tools are collectively matched, mixed, and layered within an 
even richer set of innovation policy possibilities to promote socially desirable 
outcomes. 
 
159. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (2005) (“Second-
order diversity seeks variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them. It favors inter-
organizational diversity, not intraorganizational diversity. Thus, whatever the axis of differ-
ence (race, gender, political affiliation), second-order diversity describes a system in which at 
least some decisionmaking bodies look nothing like the population from which they are 
drawn.”). 
160. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
161. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 
(2015). 
162. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1611 (2017); W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Bio-
logics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016). 
163. See Dipak C. Jain & James G. Conley, Patent Expiry and Pharmaceutical Market Opportunities at 
the Nexus of Pricing and Innovation Policy, in INNOVATION AND MARKETING IN THE PHARMACEU-
TICAL INDUSTRY 255, 263 (Min Ding et al. eds., 2014); Jason S. George & Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette, Trademarks as Innovation Incentives (May 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors). 
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Section III.A focuses on the matching of IP innovation incentives and non-
IP allocation mechanisms, and vice versa, in the market for pharmaceuticals. Sec-
tion III.B turns to examples of mixing on either side of the incentive/allocation 
divide. Section III.C brings in the international context, demonstrating that 
countries use non-IP or hybrid regimes at the domestic level while relying on 
international IP law to share the costs of innovation across borders. 
A. Matching in Practice 
The prototypical “match” of an IP innovation incentive and a non-IP alloca-
tion mechanism involves the government purchasing a patent on a knowledge 
good for a market-determined price and then putting the knowledge good in the 
public domain. But while actual transfers of patents from rights-holders to gov-
ernments are “rare,”
164
 government purchases of patented products from rights-
holders are not. 
The closest thing to a large-scale patent buyout scheme in the United States 
is the Medicaid program, which covers almost twenty percent of the U.S. popu-
lation.
165
 In 2014 alone, Medicaid purchased twenty-two billion dollars of pre-
scription drugs from pharmaceutical firms.
166
 The prices paid by Medicaid are 
based on market rates; a system of rebates ensures that Medicaid pays no more 
than the lowest price at which the drug is sold to other consumers.
167
 The Med-
icaid program, which is administered jointly by the federal government and the 




164. Isabelle Liotard & Valérie Revest, Contests as Innovation Policy Instruments: Lessons from the US 
Federal Agencies’ Experience, 127 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 57, 59 (2018). 
165. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population: 2016, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 27, 
2018), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population [https://perma.cc/42S3 
-E8LD]. Medicare Part D, discussed at further length in Section III.B, can also be considered 
a match between the patent system as an innovation incentive and an allocation mechanism 
that is partly but not purely IP-based. 
166. See David Blumenthal & David Squires, Drug Price Control: How Some Government Programs 
Do It, COMMONWEALTH FUND: POINT (May 10, 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org
/publications/blog/2016/may/drug-price-control-how-some-government-programs-do-it 
[https://perma.cc/GH6X-AZDW]. 
167. See id. Alternatively, the rebate system ensures that Medicaid pays 23.1% of the average price 
charged for patented drugs—13% for generic drugs—if that amount is lower than the lowest 
price charged to another consumer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c) (2018); Sachs, supra note 154, 
at 196. 
168. For children and pregnant women below certain income levels, drugs provided through Med-
icaid are free. For all patients below 150% of the federal poverty line, the maximum payment 
for prescription drugs is eight dollars. See Samantha Artiga et al., The Effects of Premiums and 
Cost Sharing on Low-Income Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings, HENRY J. KAISER 
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From the pharmaceutical firm’s perspective, the payoff remains based on an ex 
post, market-generated estimate of social value—although the federal govern-
ment’s inability to negotiate drug prices potentially results in a higher market-
based reward than the firm would have received if consumers were paying out 
of pocket.
169
 From the perspective of at least some patients,
170
 the allocation 
mechanism approximates an open-access regime. In countries with single-payer 
health care systems that extend to prescription drugs, matching occurs to an even 
greater extent because virtually all drugs are allocated through a mechanism 
other than monopoly pricing.
171
 
Matching in the opposite direction is also common in the pharmaceutical 
space. As discussed above,
172
 the primary rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act is that 
monopoly power will encourage commercialization of knowledge goods after the 
initial discovery. The payoff structure for grant-funded research scientists is 
largely (though not exclusively) ex ante and government-set; IP serves to allo-
cate access at the next stage. A significant share of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
output is a result of this sort of matching. Bhaven Sampat and Frank Lichtenberg 
found that between 1988 and 2005, nine percent of all new drugs approved by 
the FDA—and more than seventeen percent of “priority-review drugs,” which 
are generally the most innovative new medicines—had patents held either by a 
 
FAM. FOUND. 3 tbl.1 (June 2017), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Effects 
-of-Premiums-and-Cost-Sharing-on-Low-Income-Populations [https://perma.cc/HKG9 
-EPAN]. 
169. The minimum a government purchaser must pay for a patented drug will be set by the profit 
that the patentee could earn on the private market, whereas the maximum will depend on 
factors such as the purchaser’s and patentee’s relative bargaining power. The United States, 
unlike most other developed nations, lacks a government mechanism for negotiating prescrip-
tion drug prices. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IM-
PERATIVE 82 (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 2018). By increasing the pharmaceutical inno-
vator’s reward beyond what it would earn on the private market, the federal government is 
really moving beyond a market-set reward to provide an additional innovation incentive for 
biomedical research. See Sachs, supra note 154, at 185-92. 
170. To be sure, an eight-dollar copay may be prohibitively expensive for some very low-income 
patients. See Artiga et al., supra note 168, at 4-5. The key point is that for all Medicaid patients, 
access to prescription drugs is not allocated through the mechanism of monopoly pricing, and 
for some patients, access is free. 
171. This does not mean that pharmaceuticals are allocated on an open-access basis in countries 
with single-payer systems. Access may be rationed through nonmarket mechanisms. See 
Richard Vize, Rationing Care Is a Fact of Life for the NHS, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2015/apr/24/rationing-care-fact-of-life-nhs 
[https://perma.cc/W9LD-KB3D]. 
172. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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government agency or a government-funded laboratory (typically in aca-
demia).
173
 Additionally, citation data suggest that government funding played 
at least an indirect role in the development of almost two-thirds of FDA-ap-
proved priority-review drugs during that time period.
174
 
In sum, a large swath of the market for pharmaceuticals in the United States 
involves two scenarios. Either (a) the government purchases patented products 
from the private sector and then distributes those products to patients for free 
or at deeply discounted prices, or (b) the government develops new drugs in-
house or at federally financed laboratories and then allows firms to allocate access 
through proprietary pricing mechanisms. These two matches are not mutually 
exclusive—in many cases Medicaid will purchase a pharmaceutical product that 
was initially developed in a government or government-funded lab, bringing the 
government’s role in the innovation and allocation process full circle. The key 
point for now is that the pharmaceutical sector in the United States should not 
be seen as relying purely on IP either as an innovation incentive or as a mecha-
nism for allocating access; a fair amount of matching between IP and non-IP 
innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms occurs in this sector. 
B. Mixing in Practice 
Next, we turn to instances in which IP and non-IP tools are used on the same 
side of the innovation/allocation divide. Again, the Bayh-Dole Act proves illus-
trative. Defenders of Bayh-Dole emphasize the Act’s commercialization bene-
fits—the way it allocates access to publicly funded knowledge goods to promote 
efficient use, as discussed above.
175
 But another way in which Bayh-Dole shapes 
the innovation landscape is by changing the payoff structure for government-
funded scientists and their employers. The opportunity to reap large monetary 
rewards from patent licensing potentially leads government-funded researchers 
to pursue different projects from those that they would have tackled absent the 
 
173. Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are the Respective Roles of the Public and 
Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334-35 (2011). 
174. See id. at 335. Note that not all government funding that leads to FDA-approved drugs flows 
through academic labs or academic-industry partnerships; the government also directly funds 
industry research. See, e.g., Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Tech-
nology Transfer (STTR), NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://sbir.nih.gov [https://perma.cc
/ZS5Y-DJVE]. 
175. See supra notes 71-76, 172-174 and accompanying text. 




 The consequence is that researchers at government and gov-
ernment-funded labs may be responsive not only to politically generated esti-
mates of social value but to market estimates as well.
177
 In this respect, the Bayh-
Dole Act mixes non-IP and IP tools on the innovation side of the innovation/al-
location divide. 
The desirability of mixing IP and non-IP incentives in this context is debat-
able. In favor of mixing, one might argue that market incentives motivate gov-
ernment-funded scientists to increase their research effort, especially with re-
spect to potential innovations that have valuable real-world applications.
178
 
Against mixing, one might argue that market incentives have encouraged scien-
tists to pursue projects with the greatest commercial potential rather than the 
greatest social value—and have diverted scientists away from the basic research 
efforts that might lead to groundbreaking advances.
179
 The existing empirical 
literature does not support firm conclusions, though there is some evidence to 
suggest that the introduction of market incentives into the mix is salutary. For 
example, Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding, and Toby Stuart, in a study of nearly 
four thousand academic life scientists over three decades, found that scientists 
 
176. See Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, 
Quality, and Direction of (Public) Research Output, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 637, 668 (2009) (sug-
gesting that patenting tends to increase the rate of publication and “may also modestly shift 
the content of these publications toward questions of commercial interest”). 
177. Some scholars have found that giving university researchers a larger share of patent royalties 
leads to higher license income or patenting rates. See Nicola Baldini, Do Royalties Really Foster 
University Patenting Activity? An Answer from Italy, 30 TECHNOVATION 109, 114 (2010); Saul 
Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives and Invention in Universities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 403, 
427-28 (2008); Hans K. Hvide & Benjamin F. Jones, University Innovation and the Professor’s 
Privilege (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22057, 2016). But other schol-
ars, including one of us, have not found evidence of this effect. See Pere Arqué-Castells et al., 
How Inventor Royalty Shares Affect Patenting and Income in Portugal and Spain (IEB, Working 
Paper No. 2015/14, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585080; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & 
Andrew Tutt, How Do Patent Incentives Affect University Researchers? (Jan. 27, 2018) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with authors). 
178. See Marie Thursby, Jerry Thursby & Swasti Gupta-Mukherjee, Are There Real Effects of Licens-
ing on Academic Research? A Life Cycle View, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 577, 596 (2007) (con-
cluding that opportunities for scientists to profit from the commercialization of inventions 
potentially lead to higher research output and a larger stock of knowledge, so long as “the 
applied effort involved in licensing leads to publishable output as well as licenses”). 
179. See, e.g., Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/technology/07unbox.html [https://perma
.cc/JV9Q-EWDG]; cf. BENKLER, supra note 1, at 92-99 (suggesting that financial incentives 
may lead to less innovation if they “crowd out” intrinsic rewards). For a discussion of how 
Bayh-Dole has affected academic norms, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). 
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who engaged in more patenting activity also published more than otherwise 
equivalent nonpatenters and that their papers were published in journals with 
marginally higher impact factors.
180
 This suggests that market incentives do not 
divert scientists from other valuable research endeavors. 
We do not seek to resolve this debate here. Instead, we make two modest 
claims. First, as a theoretical matter, the addition of ex post, market-set rewards 
to the mix of incentives can have positive effects on innovation under a range of 
circumstances, either by providing additional motivation for researchers or by 
encouraging researchers to pursue projects that the political market has under-
valued. Second, in practice, the Bayh-Dole Act adds an ex post, market-set re-
ward to the payoff structure for federally funded researchers in the United States. 
Given the important role of government funding and Bayh-Dole patents in the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry,
181
 it is accurate to say that mixing of IP and non-
IP innovation incentives is a common occurrence across that sector. 
Mixing of IP and non-IP policies in the pharmaceutical space also occurs on 
the allocation side of the innovation/access divide. The most prominent U.S. ex-
ample is the federal Medicare Part D program. Enrollees in standard Medicare 
Part D plans pay a portion—but not all—of prescription drug costs after a $405 
deductible.
182
 The result is that, for enrollees in Medicare Part D plans, access to 
prescription drugs is not entirely determined by monopoly pricing, but it is not 
entirely open access either. Instead, the partial subsidy gives rise to a system in 
which access is allocated through a mix of market power and government assis-
tance. 
There is little evidence to suggest that Medicare Part D’s mixing of allocation 
mechanisms was the result of a high-minded effort by lawmakers to harness the 
 
180. Azoulay, Ding & Stuart, supra note 176, at 651-52, 667, 670. Note that while patenters and 
nonpatenters have different publication trends before the initiation of patenting, the authors 
account for self-selection into patenting on the basis of observable characteristics, including 
lagged productivity and the latent patentability of a scientist’s research trajectory. Id. at 639. 
For other studies reaching similar conclusions, see, for example, Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto 
Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory: Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 
37 RES. POL’Y 914, 929 (2008); Brent Goldfarb, Gerald Marschke & Amy Smith, Scholarship 
and Inventive Activity in the University: Complements or Substitutes?, 18 ECON. INNOVATION & 
NEW TECH. 743 (2009); and Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Has the Bayh-Dole Act 
Compromised Basic Research?, 40 RES. POL’Y 1077, 1081-83 (2011). 
181. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. 
182. The cost-sharing formula is complicated, but in brief: most enrollees pay 25% of costs up to 
$3,750 per year, 35% to 44% of costs from there until they hit an $8,418 “catastrophic coverage 
threshold” for the year, and 5% of costs above the catastrophic coverage threshold. See The 
Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2-3 (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-The-Medicare-Part-D-Prescription-Drug 
-Benefit [https://perma.cc/M7SP-PN54]. 
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informational benefits of proprietary pricing while mitigating the attendant al-
locative inefficiencies. Instead, budgetary constraints and political compromise 
shaped the program, which was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 
2003.
183
 A perhaps unintended consequence, however, is that Medicare Part D 
offers an interior solution of the sort suggested by Weyl and Tirole: patients and 
prescribers reveal some information about how much they value particular drugs 
through their purchasing behavior, but the partial subsidy reduces the 
deadweight loss of monopoly pricing.
184
 
In any event, whatever the wisdom of Medicare Part D’s approach, the pro-
gram’s centrality to the U.S. pharmaceutical market is undeniable. Nearly forty-
one million Medicare beneficiaries are now enrolled in Part D plans,
185
 and more 
than thirty percent of all prescription drug spending in the United States is via 
Part D.
186
 For a very large swath of the population, pharmaceutical drugs are 
allocated neither fully on the basis of proprietary pricing nor through open ac-
cess, but instead through a mix of IP and non-IP mechanisms. 
C. Layering in Practice 
In Section II.D we suggested that international IP law could serve as a mech-
anism for sharing the costs of knowledge production across borders even when 
countries rely on non-IP innovation incentives or allocation mechanisms inter-
nally. Here, we seek to show that notwithstanding the hybridity of domestic in-
novation policy, the United States and other countries continue to use IP to al-
locate knowledge production costs among countries. 
 
183. See Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 
MILBANK Q. 283, 309-16 (2004). 
184. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text. 
185. Jack Hoadley et al., Medicare Part D in 2016 and Trends over Time, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. 4 (Sept. 2016), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicare-Part-D-in-2016 
-and-Trends-over-Time [https://perma.cc/AEH7-MQYH]. 
186. See Lacie Glover, Here’s How Much We Spent on Prescription Drugs Last Year, MONEY (June 2, 
2015), https://time.com/money/3904386/prescription-drugs-costs [https://perma.cc
/U4FN-UWM6] (reporting that $374 billion in prescription drug spending in 2014 repre-
sented a 13.1% increase from the previous year); Katie Thomas & Robert Pear, Medicare Re-
leases Detailed Data on Prescription Drug Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/business/medicare-releases-detailed-data-on-prescription-drug 
-spending.html [https://perma.cc/WBN2-32F8] (reporting $103 billion in spending on pre-
scription drugs through Medicare Part D in 2013). 
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Our evidence comes from original data analysis regarding patent filings by 
United States universities from 2000 to 2011.
187
 During that period, U.S. univer-
sities filed 36,943 patent families—groups of patents protecting a single inven-
tion—at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), nearly thirty-six percent 
of which were also filed at the European Patent Office. United States universities 
also frequently filed patent families in Canada, Japan, Australia, China, and 
South Korea.
188
 Scientists at these universities encounter a payoff structure that 
includes non-IP innovation incentives (in the form of government grants) as 
well as IP-based incentives (in the form of potential profits from Bayh-Dole pa-
tents). At the domestic level, the patent system allocates access to their innova-
tions through pure non-IP mechanisms (e.g., Medicaid) and through mixed IP 
and non-IP mechanisms (e.g., Medicare Part D). 
Despite this mixing and matching of domestic innovation incentives and al-
location mechanisms with respect to knowledge goods produced at U.S. univer-
sities, IP dominates the global picture. That is, U.S. universities and their licen-
sees use international IP law to extract payments from other countries that use 
U.S.-generated knowledge goods. (As noted above, it is irrelevant to our analysis 
whether the payments are made directly to the U.S. government or to private 
firms within the U.S. that can be separately taxed by the U.S. government.
189
) 
Those foreign countries may themselves allocate access internally through non-
IP mechanisms such as single-payer health care systems. Interestingly, we see 
very low filing rates in less affluent countries, somewhat allaying concerns about 
global distributive justice. Indeed, only 0.1% of patent families filed by United 
States universities at the PTO were also filed in countries that the World Bank 
classifies as “lower-income economies.”
190
 International IP law thus serves pri-
marily to reallocate the costs of knowledge production among high- and middle-
income countries. 
 
187. We report our findings in Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 152, at 301-05. 
188. Not all filings by U.S. universities reflect pharmaceutical patents, but Bayh-Dole licensing 
activity has been focused primarily on pharmaceutical and other life-science innovations. See 
Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and 
Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 435, 437 n.5 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2011) (cit-
ing data from the Association of University Technology Managers indicating that seventy per-
cent of active Bayh-Dole licenses are in the life sciences). Moreover, not all U.S. university 
research is federally funded, but a majority of it is. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 152, at 
283 n.10. 
189. See supra Section II.D. 
190. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 152, at 305 tbl.1. 
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In sum, the pharmaceutical industry, domestically and globally, provides ex-
amples of widespread matching, mixing, and layering in practice. Characteriza-
tions of the pharmaceutical industry as a paradigm of the patent system overlook 
the multiple and overlapping innovation policy regimes that drive innovation 
and allocate access to vital treatments. Patent law’s poster child presents us with 
a potentially fruitful environment in which to investigate innovation policy plu-
ralism’s real-world successes and shortcomings. 
iv.  matching, mixing, and layering beyond patents 
Thus far, we have illustrated our framework using examples drawn primarily 
from the world of patents and patent alternatives.
191
 But our distinction between 
innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms, as well as our discussion of 
matching, mixing, and layering, can inform and be informed by debates beyond 
patent law. Section IV.A considers the utility of our approach for other areas of 
intellectual property law that can cover less technical knowledge goods—chiefly 
copyright and, more tentatively, trademark. Section IV.B reflects upon the rela-
tionship between innovation policy debates and parallel conversations in the law 
of real and personal property. We conclude that certain aspects of our approach 
are specific to the production and allocation of knowledge goods that historically 
have enjoyed patent protection, while other elements extend well beyond the 
knowledge-good domain. 
A. IP Beyond Patents 
Perhaps the most straightforward application of our framework is to the pro-
duction and allocation of creative works—film, fine art, literature, music, and so 
on. Here, as in patent law, intellectual property protection is simultaneously jus-
tified on the ground that it incentivizes creation and criticized on the ground that 
it generates allocative inefficiencies.
192
 Again, as with patent-protected 
knowledge goods, the market-based innovation incentive offered by copyright 
law needs not bring with it the full deadweight loss of proprietary pricing. The 
matching strategies described above—such as second-price auctions for IP rights 
resulting in government buyouts in a subset of cases—could be cross-applied to 
 
191. As noted above, we treat patents as akin to other exclusivity mechanisms such as trade secrets 
and FDA-administered regulatory exclusivity. See supra notes 18, 161-163 and accompanying 
text. 
192. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that copy-
right law “reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest”—on the one hand, 
“stimulat[ing] artistic creativity,” while on the other hand, “promoting broad public availa-
bility of literature, music, and the other arts”). 
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creative works as well. For instance, authors might put new novels up for auc-
tion, with publishers bidding for exclusive rights; then in 1 – p cases, the gov-
ernment would swoop in and buy the novel at the second-highest price, there-
after placing the work in the public domain. This is but one example of the many 
possible allocation and innovation schemes that exist beyond traditional IP. 
The advantages of such an arrangement for creative works—a match be-
tween an IP innovation incentive and a non-IP allocation mechanism—are in 
some respects even greater than the virtues of similar matches in the context of 
historically patent-protected knowledge goods. First, whatever unease we might 
have with the notion of the government picking and choosing which R&D pro-
jects to pursue in a field such as biotechnology, our unease is likely many times 
greater when we contemplate the government picking and choosing which nov-
els to write or which films to shoot. The case for market-set rather than govern-
ment-set rewards in the creative space seems strong enough on comparative-
competency grounds (do we think that the government can identify—and would 
finance—the next coming of The Underground Railroad
193
 or Black Panther?
194
). 
And even if the government could anticipate the next winner of the Pulitzer Prize 
for fiction or the next box office sensation, concerns about free expression and 
democratic discourse might lead us to reject such direct government involvement 
in the production of art and thought. On the allocation side, meanwhile, the 
problems with proprietary pricing may be even more acute with respect to crea-
tive works than with, say, new pharmaceutical products. Creative works are in 
many cases antirivalrous: the fact that you and I have read the same novel or 
watched the same film potentially enhances the enjoyment of the experience for 
both of us.
195
 Under these conditions, the socially optimal allocation policy ar-
guably entails a negative price (i.e., a subsidy) rather than simply free access. 
Proprietary pricing may be even further from the ideal in this context than in 
other areas. 
In scattered circumstances, we observe variants of a match between an IP 
innovation incentive and a non-IP allocation mechanism for creative works. Per-
haps the most obvious example is public libraries, which spend over one billion 
dollars of taxpayer money each year purchasing copies of books and other copy-
 
193. COLSON WHITEHEAD, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (2016). 
194. BLACK PANTHER (Marvel Studios 2018). 
195. Consider, for example, the pleasure you derive from discussing a favorite novel with a friend 
who has read the same work, or from being able to drop allusions to a popular sitcom in 
conversations without having to explain the joke, or from debating the twist ending of a de-
tective series among colleagues without having to broadcast a spoiler alert to all within ear-
shot. 
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righted works, sometimes at a steep discount but other times at close to the mar-
ket price,
196
 and then providing free access to those copies.
197
 Public museums, 
such as the National Gallery and the museums within the Smithsonian Institu-
tion, do the same for works of fine art. In other cases, federal, state, and local 
governments directly or indirectly subsidize nongovernmental institutions that 
purchase or lease copyrighted works and make those works accessible to the 
public at low or no cost. For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York has received approximately $28 million per year, almost 8% of the mu-
seum’s total funding, from the City of New York in recent years.
198
 The City of 
Chicago imposes a property surtax that partially funds several of the city’s lead-
ing art museums.
199
 Approximately 41% of public television revenues and 16% 
of public radio revenues come from a combination of federal, state, and local 
government support.
200
 On top of all this, the federal income tax deduction for 
charitable contributions operates as a subsidy for gifts to museums, performing-
arts organizations, and other entities that make creative works available to the 
public for free or at reduced cost.
201
 
Locating some of these expenditures on the innovation-incentive or alloca-
tion-mechanism side of the incentive/allocation divide exposes the potential per-
meability of the separation between the two. Should we think about the federal 
subsidy for public radio as an innovation incentive that encourages the produc-
tion of shows such as WBEZ’s This American Life or as an allocation mechanism 
that makes shows like This American Life available to listeners for free? Tracing 
 
196. See The Disappearing Library Discount, AM. LIBR.: E-CONTENT (Feb. 4, 2013), https:// 
americanlibrariesmagazine.org/blogs/e-content/the-disappearing-library-discount 
[https://perma.cc/ZW32-CLRV]. 
197. See Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 34 (2015). 
198. See One Hundred Forty-Seventh Annual Report of the Trustees for the Fiscal Year July 1, 2016, 
Through June 30, 2017, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM ART 85 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www 
.metmuseum.org/-/media/Files/About%20The%20Met/Annual%20Reports/2016-2017
/Annual%20Report%202016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A6G-ZXPS]. 
199. See 2018 Chicago Park Budget Summary, CHI. PARK DISTRICT 47 (2018), https://www 
.chicagoparkdistrict.com/sites/default/files/documents/departments/budget/2018-budget 
-summary1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W83A-H9L6]. 
200. See Alternative Sources of Funding for Public Broadcasting Stations, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCAST-
ING 17-18 (June 20, 2012), https://www.cpb.org/files/aboutcpb/Alternative_Sources_of 
_Funding_for_Public_Broadcasting_Stations.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K5B-R6TH]. 
201. The Joint Committee on Taxation does not break out a separate estimate for the tax expendi-
ture associated with charitable contributions that subsidize dissemination of creative works. 
The expenditure associated with the deduction for charitable contributions other than for ed-
ucation and health was approximately $45 billion in 2017. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, 
at 37 (2017). 
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the flow of federal funds (do government dollars go toward production or to-
ward dissemination?) is only partly informative: money is fungible, so funds 
that offset WBEZ’s broadcasting costs allow WBEZ to shift resources toward the 
making of shows. The distinction between innovation incentives and allocation 
mechanisms—through crisp in some circumstances—becomes blurrier when we 
imagine the government subsidizing organizations that both produce new con-
tent and distribute that content for free or at discounted prices. 
What about matches in the opposite direction—the use of non-IP tools to 
bring about the production of creative works coupled with IP as an allocation 
mechanism? In the United States, the federal government has explicitly dis-
claimed copyright protection for government-created works such as statutes, 
codes, judicial opinions, and agency reports,
202
 as have some states.
203
 The Su-
preme Court has held that a state cannot claim copyright protection for judicial 
decisions.
204
 Significantly, however, there are other cases in which government 
copyright claims have been recognized or entertained. For example, the Second 
Circuit has said that official tax maps created by a New York county do not au-
tomatically enter the public domain.
205
 Outside the United States, government 
copyrighting is more common: for instance, the “Crown copyright” in the 
United Kingdom applies to government-created works for fifty years from the 
time of publication (or 125 years for unpublished works).
206
 But even in the 
Crown copyright context, members of the public generally can license govern-
ment-created works for free or for a nominal fee.
207
 Instances of governments 





202. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2018). 
203. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 395-400 (2009) (re-
jecting the California county’s claim that state law allows it to claim copyright protection with 
respect to county’s geographic information-system basemap). 
204. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-54 (1888). 
205. See County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 195 (2d Cir. 2001). A distinct 
but related question arises when privately authored standards and codes are incorporated into 
public law. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 453-
61 (2003) (surveying cases). In those instances, IP is used both to incentivize creation and (if 
copyright is respected after the standard or code is incorporated) to allocate access, notwith-
standing the government’s use of the material for public purposes. 
206. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. X, § 163 (UK); see Ruth L. Okediji, Government 
as Owner of Intellectual Property? Considerations for Public Welfare in the Era of Big Data, 18 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 347-48 (2016). 
207. Okediji, supra note 206, at 348. 
208. See supra Section II.B.2 (reviewing these justifications in the patent context). 
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More common are mixes of IP and non-IP tools on the incentive side of the 
(sometimes permeable) incentive/allocation divide. Despite what is sometimes 
described as an aversion to aesthetic judgments by government decision mak-
ers,
209
 the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) distributes around $110 mil-
lion per year—a sum that, though it might seem substantial on its own, amounts 
to well under 0.01% of the federal budget—to writers, artists, and creative initi-
atives across the country.
210
 A writer or artist who receives an NEA grant is in no 
way precluded from also claiming copyright protection. Thirty-one states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands offer tax incen-
tives for film production.
211
 The largest such program, in New York state, offers 
$420 million in refundable tax credits per year.
212
 Upfront rewards help to offset 
the capital costs of moviemaking and might be rationalized on those grounds,
213
 
though some see these tax incentives as part of a “race to the bottom” among 
states seeking to lure business away from their neighbors.
214
 These tax incen-
tives, like NEA grants, are supplements to rather than substitutes for traditional 
IP protection. Even the pages of the Yale Law Journal exhibit mixing in action: 
faculty members at public (and, to a lesser extent, private) universities rely in 
part on government funding while also claiming copyright protection for their 
creative works. 
For creative works perhaps even more than for other knowledge goods, we 
can anticipate a potentially compelling argument in favor of content- and view-
point-neutral subsidies (to borrow terms from First Amendment jurispru-
dence). We might argue that we do not want the government dictating the sub-
stance of creative works, but we do want some subsidy for producers and 
 
209. See Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (2017). 
210. 2016 Annual Report, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS 1, 6 (2017), https://www.arts.gov/sites 
/default/files/2016%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D783-V843]; 
Quick Facts, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS 1, https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/nea 
-quick-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/7955-TLSS]. Per capita public funding for the arts is sub-
stantially higher in other developed countries. See Research Div., International Data on Gov-
ernment Spending on the Arts, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS 1, 9 tbl.1 (Jan. 2000), https://www
.arts.gov/sites/default/files/74.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YJ8-36NW]. 
211. See State Film Production Incentives & Programs, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 1 (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/fiscal/2018StateFilmIncentivePrograms
_20189.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9D8-4DH9]. 
212. 2016 Annual Report, supra note 210, at 13. 
213. See supra Section II.C.1.b. 
214. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich: Production Tax Incentives Create ‘A 
Race to the Bottom,’ VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:39 PM PT), https://variety.com/2013/biz/news
/robert-reich-former-labor-secretary-says-movie-and-tv-tax-incentives-create-a-race-to-the
-bottom-1200856000 [https://perma.cc/4NLJ-936T]. 
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consumers. Copyright protection does not allow creators to capture all of the 
positive externalities of their work,
215
 and proprietary pricing leads to inefficient 
restrictions on access. Under these circumstances, a subsidy such as the charita-
ble-contribution deduction, which does not entail the government picking and 




Consideration of creative works also draws our attention to the expressive 
interests at stake in the production and allocation of knowledge goods. Does J.K. 
Rowling have a legally cognizable interest in, say, determining whether Harry 
Potter and Hermione Granger ultimately pair off?
217
 A detailed discussion of fan 
fiction in copyright law lies well beyond our present scope.
218
 But the Harry-
Hermione example is intended to show that in the context of creative works, 
authors and artists may have an interest (sometimes characterized as a “moral 
right”) in determining how their works are used ex post. Simply replicating the 
pecuniary returns from a copyright-conferred monopoly would not leave the 




215. To be sure, copyright protection now lasts for the life of the creator plus seventy years, which 
would seem to lead to internalization of almost all the present value of a creative work. See 17 
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018). But other elements of copyright law, such as the fair use doctrine, 
limit the reach of copyright protection. See id. § 107; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-78 (1994) (discussing the evolution and elements of fair use). And even 
before any question of fair use arises, the monopoly conferred by copyright law is limited. For 
example, The Sopranos might have changed television in ways that made Breaking Bad possi-
ble, but HBO (which made The Sopranos) would likely face insurmountable legal obstacles 
(and perhaps judicially imposed sanctions) if it sued Sony Pictures, the studio behind Break-
ing Bad, for copyright infringement. 
216. This is not to say that the government should be viewpoint neutral in all realms: we probably 
do want the government to be allowed to print Harriet Tubman’s face on postage stamps 
without printing Adolf Hitler’s. We discuss the origins and justifications for the First Amend-
ment government speech doctrine at greater length in Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33. 
217. See Antonia Molloy, Harry Potter Should Have Married Hermione, Admits J K Rowling, INDE-
PENDENT (Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/harry-should 
-have-married-hermione-says-j-k-rowling-9102110.html [https://perma.cc/G4K7-WE4C]. 
218. For more extended discussions, see, for example, Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Eve-
ryone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
597 (2007); and Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997). 
219. This does not mean that recognizing a creator’s expressive interests is necessarily salutary. If 
legal recognition of such interests—such as through a right of attribution—creates a wider 
gap between creators’ and users’ valuation of a work, it may decrease efficient transactions 
over creative goods. See Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental 
Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1428-31 (2013). 
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Yet as Jeanne Fromer has argued, expressive interests in intellectual property 
are not confined to the copyright context.
220
 Inventors whose work would his-
torically be eligible for patent protection also have potentially powerful person-
hood interests bound up in their inventions. In some cases, inventors might care 
deeply that their work be available to the public on an open-access basis.
221
 In 
other instances, they might care about controlling access and thus maintaining 
the ability to mediate between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” uses.
222
 As 
Fromer has suggested, the prospect of being able to control access ex post may 
be one element of the motivation for creators to create and for inventors to in-
vent.
223
 For a non-IP reward to match IP’s innovation incentive, then, the pecu-
niary reward may need to be scaled up to compensate the producer not only for 
the loss of monopoly profits but also for the loss of control over access (and there 
are perhaps some creators or inventors who will swear that no amount of money 
would compensate them for the loss of control). 
Lastly with respect to copyrights, our discussion of layering has direct appli-
cation to the sharing of creative works across borders. Consider, for example, the 
international licensing of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) shows such 
as Doctor Who.
224
 Focusing solely on the United Kingdom, we might describe 
production and allocation as governed by non-IP regimes: a government corpo-
ration produces the show, which is then distributed for free domestically 
(though U.K. residents under age seventy-five who have televisions in their 
homes are obligated to pay a license fee that covers some of the BBC’s costs
225
). 
The BBC then uses international IP law to spread costs across the dozens of 
countries where Doctor Who is watched.
226
 
The application of our framework to a third area of IP, trademark law, is less 
obvious, and our observations are more tentative. Judges as well as casebook and 
treatise authors have emphasized that trademark law is not intended to be an 
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 and so the innovation-incentive/allocation-mechanism 
framework might seem like an awkward fit. Yet trademark law can be character-
ized as promoting product differentiation, which might be seen to generate pos-
itive externalities. For example, Coca-Cola’s investments in developing a distinct 
mark and trade dress arguably benefit not only Coca-Cola and the consumers 
who purchase it but also the shoppers who are looking for Pepsi. 
Trademark law is not, however, the only way in which society supports in-
vestments in product differentiation. The federal income tax treatment of adver-
tising costs—allowing a full deduction in the year that the expense is incurred—
historically has operated as a subsidy for advertising expenditures, as it relieves 
advertising costs from the normal rule of capitalization and amortization for in-
vestments that generate benefits beyond the taxable year.
228
 The notion of using 
nontrademark tools to promote investment in product differentiation arguably 
becomes more attractive as the problems with trademark grow more acute. For 
example, Barton Beebe and Jeanne Fromer conclude on the basis of a systematic 
study of roughly seven million trademarks and trademark applications that the 
supply of standard English words, common American surnames, and short neo-
logisms available for trademark registration is approaching exhaustion.
229
 If in-
deed trademark provides an ever-less-useful way to distinguish among brands, 
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then we might consider whether non-IP tools, including tax incentives, can pro-
mote investment in the public good of product differentiation.
230
 Arguably they 
already do. 
B. Matching, Mixing, and Layering Beyond IP 
While our thoughts on trademark law are tentative, our reflections on our 
framework’s implications for—and interactions with—the law of real property 
are even more so, in part because the study of terra firma is terra incognita for us 
both. Nevertheless, we believe that our approach can parallel with—and might 
even offer insights for—the study of real property and land use. More generally, 
we see our project as consistent with, and perhaps contributing towards, an 
emerging project among scholars of intellectual and real property alike that aims 
to disaggregate and destabilize the very idea of “property.” 
We start with the most obvious overlaps. The notion that the government 
might purchase real-property rights from holders and then make that property 
available to all—what we might call a property-nonproperty match—is familiar 
from the land-use context. (Indeed, the power of eminent domain allows the 
government to consummate these transactions even over the holder’s refusal.) 
Likewise, the idea that the government might “produce” real property itself and 
then sell or give away the right to exclude—a nonproperty-property match—is re-
flected in the shape of many American cities that sit (sometimes uneasily) on 
landfill.
231
 Mixes of property and nonproperty incentives, as well as property and 
nonproperty allocation mechanisms, are widespread too. On the supply side, the 
government incentivizes the production and rehabilitation of affordable housing 
by combining property-rights protection with the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit.
232
 On the demand side, subsidies such as the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Vouchers Program make access to housing available to low-income families for 
an amount greater than zero but less than the rent they would pay in a pure 
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 And while the international trade in knowledge 
goods finds no real-property parallel, one might draw an analogy between IP 
layering and the Westphalian system of territorial sovereignty: each country en-
joys something akin to a fee-simple absolute interest in its own territory but re-
mains free to choose among property and nonproperty regimes to allocate land 
domestically. 
For the conversation between real property and intellectual property scholars 
to generate useful insights, however, it must go beyond simply identifying the 
many ways in which the regimes for tangible and intangible assets mirror one 
another. It must identify ways in which real-property regimes, actual or imag-
ined, might inform the design of innovation policy, and vice versa. Consider one 
example. A number of authors—including Lee Fennell, Saul Levmore, Florenz 
Plassmann, Nicolaus Tideman, and, most recently, Eric Posner and Glen 
Weyl
234
—have discussed the possibility of self-assessment regimes for real prop-
erty as a solution to anticommons problems in the land-use context. The basic 
idea is that property owners would self-assess the value of their property and 
would report that value to a central registry. Owners would pay an annual tax 
calculated as a percentage of the self-assessed value, generating an incentive not 
to overstate. Meanwhile, any interested buyer would have the right to force the 
owner to sell the property for the self-assessed value, generating an incentive not 
to understate. (A variant of such a regime was in fact implemented in Taiwan 
from the 1950s to the 1970s, though it allowed only the government—and not 
any third-party purchaser—to acquire real property for the self-assessed 
price.
235
) A key advantage of this sort of regime (aside from revenue raising) is 
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that it would make it easier to assemble parcels held by different owners for a 
more productive use without holdouts derailing the plan. A disadvantage is that 
the tax—which is necessary to elicit accurate self-assessments—also deters prop-
erty holders from making value-enhancing investments in the property because 
some of the increase in value is lost to the tax.
236
 
Mixing might help to solve this problem. If imposing an ex post tax on the 
increase in value of the property right reduces incentives to invest, then adding 
an ex ante nonproperty subsidy for investment (e.g., a tax credit for spending on 
structures) might serve to offset. To be sure, if the goal of the self-assessment 
regime is to facilitate revenue collection, then the addition of the ex ante tax 
break is self-defeating. But if the purpose of the ex post tax is simply to encour-
age honest self-assessment and thus to facilitate land assembly, then combining 
the ex post tax with an ex ante subsidy for investment would seem to be advan-
tageous. Our analysis above underscores the fact that property is not the only 
possible mechanism for incentivizing investment. A mix of property and non-
property incentives for investment, combined with limits on property rights to 
avoid holdout,
237
 might be an improvement over some of the self-assessment 
regimes already contemplated and implemented.
238
 
Posner and Weyl, as well as Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy, have sug-
gested that self-assessment regimes might be useful in the knowledge-good con-
text too.
239
 Although a full exploration of that possibility lies beyond the scope 
of this Article, for present purposes we emphasize a point that is both more mod-
est and more sweeping. The discussion of self-assessment regimes in the real-
property context highlights the fact that market-based mechanisms can be used 
in ways that destabilize traditional notions of property rights—the free market 
is not coterminous with the fee-simple absolute. Likewise, our analysis of match-
ing and mixing reveals ways in which policy makers can harness market mecha-
nisms to incentivize innovation and allocate access to knowledge goods without 
adopting a pure IP regime. From patent buyouts
240
 to Bayh-Dole market tests
241
 
to reliance on venture capital to finance entrants in government-sponsored prize 
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competitions, innovation policy pluralism need not entail the replacement of 
market mechanisms with central planning. While policy makers might have per-
suasive reasons to reject market-based estimates of social value in the 
knowledge-good context, our analysis—informed by real-property scholarship 
on market-based alternatives to fee-simple regimes—reminds us that IP and 
markets need not travel together in the innovation domain. 
conclusion 
Intellectual property is not a monolith. Throughout this Article, we have 
demonstrated that the bundle known as “intellectual property” can be disaggre-
gated into an ex post, market-set innovation incentive and an allocation mechanism 
based on proprietary pricing. We have shown that non-IP alternatives are possi-
ble on both sides of the incentive/allocation divide. We have analyzed a number 
of ways that IP and non-IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms 
might be combined in theory and in practice. 
Table 1 below recapitulates our framework. Matching an IP innovation in-
centive with a non-IP allocation mechanism may be desirable when policy mak-
ers seek to harness the motivational power of ex post rewards or to leverage pri-
vate information on consumers’ willingness to pay for a new knowledge good, 
all while avoiding the deadweight loss of proprietary pricing. Matching a non-
IP innovation incentive with an IP allocation mechanism may be attractive when 
policy makers seek to spur initial discovery with a government-set, risk-free re-
ward that does not compel researchers to turn to capital markets, while at the 
same time using market power to encourage the commercialization of new 
knowledge goods or the management of negative externalities. Mixing IP and 
non-IP innovation incentives may be desirable when neither market-generated 
nor politically produced estimates of social value are accurate, and when accuracy 
can be enhanced by combining the two. Mixing on the allocation side of the di-
vide may occur for informational reasons (to encourage consumers to reveal 
some data about willingness to pay) or for distributional reasons (to impose a 
partial user-pays system). All this can occur beneath a layer of international law 
that binds countries to a cross-border IP regime. 
The normative implications of innovation policy pluralism are, we think, sig-
nificant and multifaceted. As we have argued throughout this Article, pluralistic 
innovation policy arrangements can advance social goals under a wide range of 
circumstances. Yet the implications that follow from our analysis go beyond dis-
crete policy prescriptions. We believe that the pluralistic approach outlined in 
this Article should shape the way that scholars and policy makers think and talk 
about IP and its alternatives. Critiques of IP that focus on the “crowding out” 
effect of IP’s market-based innovation incentive do not necessarily implicate the 
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use of proprietary pricing to allocate access. Concerns about the deadweight loss 
of IP monopolies do not necessarily preclude the use of market-based signals to 
set rewards for the production of knowledge goods. Defenses of IP that empha-
size the superiority of market signals over government direction do not justify 
the use of IP for allocative purposes, and arguments in favor of IP based on user-
pays principles do not necessary explain reliance on IP for incentive purposes. 
Finally, innovation policy choices at the international and national levels can be 
delinked, with countries converging on one approach at the global level while 
going their own ways domestically. These insights suggest that participants in 
debates about innovation policy should demand and supply arguments aimed 
specifically at the aspect of IP that they believe merits preservation or warrants 
change. While pure IP and purely non-IP policies may be appropriate under cer-
tain circumstances, they are only so when both the innovation incentive and the 
access allocation components have been scrutinized and justified. 
Fortunately, the all-or-nothing assumptions that sometimes seep into de-
bates about innovation policy have not prevented pluralistic arrangements from 
emerging in the real world. Matching, mixing, and layering already are prevalent 
in practice, with the pharmaceutical sector providing a particularly clear illustra-
tion of all three strategies being deployed. Oftentimes this pluralism occurs by 
accident, but we hope that a nuanced understanding of IP’s distinct components 
will facilitate the strategic use of pluralistic approaches as policy makers confront 
new innovation challenges. Our hope is that the analysis offered in this Article 
can aid the evaluation of existing pluralistic arrangements and open the door to 
new combinatorial possibilities. Innovation policy pluralism can frame conver-
sations, encourage experimentation, and enrich the menu of options available 
for producing and disseminating knowledge goods. 
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TABLE 1.  
MIXING, MATCHING, AND LAYERING OF IP AND NON-IP POLICIES 













− Harness motivational power 
of ex post reward 
− Leverage private information 
on willingness to pay for  
innovation 
− Avoid deadweight loss of 
proprietary pricing 
− Government patent 
buyouts at market- 
determined prices, 
with invention then 
placed into public  
domain 
Non-IP innovation 
incentive with IP 
allocation mecha-
nism 
− Alleviate capital constraints 
through upfront financing 
− Rely on democratic decision-
making process to select 
projects worthy of support 
− Allow for market power to 
encourage commercializa-
tion after initial innovation 
− Use proprietary pricing to 
regulate negative externali-
ties 
− Exclusive licensing of 
government-funded 
innovations to  
private-sector firms 
− (Proposed) extended 










IP and non-IP in-
novation incentives 
− Combine information on  
social value from economic 
and political markets 
− Allow government-
funded researchers to 
seek patents 
IP and non-IP allo-
cation mechanisms 
− Glean information from 
consumers’ willingness to 
pay without full deadweight 
loss of proprietary pricing 
− Shift portion of product 
costs to users for  
distributional reasons 
− Partial government 
subsidies for pur-











with non-IP or  
hybrid domestic  
regimes 
− Share costs of knowledge 
production across countries 
without forcing any country 
to pay more than the value it 
derives from innovation 
− Overseas patenting 
activity by U.S. uni-
versities that conduct 
government-funded 
research (often with 
foreign governments 
then reallocating to 
citizens through non-
IP mechanisms) 
 
